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The Impertinent Dust
Bruce P. Woodford
DR. NELDER
^ Professor of
Literature ^ prowling through
the stacks at the public li-
brary, suddenly knew he was sick
of it. And for the first time in
twenty years he took notice of
things. He saw^ the dust along the
metal shelves of the stacks, and dust
lying over the dormant books and
in corners of the floor. There was
a chalky dryness in the air and a
dry sound in the low voices of peo-
ple in the next aisle. He halted and
heard, as though for the first time,
all the low ambiguous rustlings and
whispers and scrapes and turning of
papers that surrounded him, and he
was suddenly sick of it.
For over twenty years he had
known little else. He had been at
the University for so long that it
seemed to him now he had lost some
intimate and subtle sense of the
world. He had become ingrown and
near-sighted over an endless proces-
sion of ill-written and unimagina-
tive themes and incompetent test
papers. He had never been a partic-
ularly good teacher, but was con-
sidered a dependable and safely
academic man who read each class
the same lessons and who occasion-
ally missed the point of a joke.
"The Hell with it," he w^hispered
softly.
He tossed the book back onto a
shelf beside all the other dusty books
and walked out into the sunlight.
It was late summer and the bright
air was warm and windless. Across
the open parkway which surrounded
the library, a row of green benches
was arranged in a semicircle around
a spouting fountain. Several of
them were occupied by old men and
by an occasional tired woman stop-
ping to rest her heavy shopping-bag
and to stare blankly at the vomiting
bronze seals in the fountain.
How green everything looks, he
came to him.
thought. How, how
Woluptuous was the word that
He was still a young man but he
was tired, and he was sick of the
slow sapless withering of his exist-
ence, and he was filled with a faint
resentment toward everything which
contributed to it. He walked toward
a vacant bench nursing a silent
grudge toward all the papers and
books and shelves and dusts that
the large world of men contained.
He sat down and ht a cigarette and
looked at the grass beyond the
fountain and at the cloudless sky
over the city and the slow casual
figures of people walking about on
the grass and the pavements under
the cloudness sky.
A vague sense of his own failure,
and the memory and regret — which
he had believed long ago stamped
out ^- of an unfulfilled ambition re-
turned to him. He had wanted to
write, but there had been too many
obstacles, too many practical con-
siderations. He had dreamed once
of being great and important and
famous, of shocking the world with
his terrifying revelations, of stunning
the miserly and the mean, of shat-
Four Quarters
tering tKe infamous illusions of
tfie powerful.
Instead, he scrawled red marks on
the abortive literary efforts of im-
pertinent students who would one
day themselves be miserly, mean
and infamous. And he was sick of
it. In his own way he too had been
miserly, and his life had grown
mean, and what he said never shat-
tered nor shocked. He had grown
dry and dusty.
He glanced about him at the faces
of old men staring at their feet, ab-
sorbed in that last clinging warmth
of a vanishing season; and he saw
that they too were dry and dust
ridden. From a near bench an
elderly woman rose and shuffled
away dragging a shopping-bag
which struck her thin ankles at every
step. The afternoon was already far
advanced and people were begin-
ning to drift toward him, slowly,
uncertainly, as though reluctant to
spend another evening in the littered
corners into which their lives had
long and imperceptibly settled.
Across the semicircle a dark haired
woman sat down. She was alone
and wore a white dress. She was
younger than the others. She
seemed to be staring at him, and
for a moment Dr. Nelder thought
perhaps he had known her some-
where '— perhaps even a former stu-
dent; but he quickly recognized his
mistake and looked away without
knowang why he looked away. But
his eyes continued in a wide search-
ing arc and returned to watch her.
She sat with her skirt slightly drawn
up, her exposed knees crossed and
pointed in his direction, and the
afternoon sunlight penetrating the
fabric of her dress showed white
legs above the knees. She continued
to stare at him, and then (he was
reminded of a cat before a fireplace)
with a casual gesture she stretched,
holding her body erect, breasts lifted
firmly, and settled back in com-
fort, her eyes calmly and steadily
regarding him.
He was still a young man and he
looked upon her with a young fas-
cination. After several minutes two
yet younger men in uniform ap-
proached and stopped directly in
front of her, and Dr. Nelder could
see them talking. He could near
nothing that was said, but he no-
ticed the girl appeared to answer.
Then as quickly as the soldiers had
approached, they departed and their
steps now moved with a kind of
secret assurance.
When they were gone, the girl
rose quickly and, with the same
attitude of assurance, walked out of
the park in another direction. She
glanced back once as she entered
the street, and Dr. Nelder suddenly
realized that she would meet the
young men at some designated hotel
room that same afternoon.
He had never seen it before, yet
he knew by some instinct w^hat he
had seen, and he was astonished at
the casual and almost flippant effi-
ciency of the whole procedure — nor
could he forget that she had first
looked at him.
And he thought suddenly that
not all the dust was dead and dry,
that some was crude and coarse and
young. Some of it was caught up
and swept along into the gutter, but
the low ambiguous rustlings and
whispers and scrapes of it were
caused by what was not yet withered
and old, by a passion that was both
impertinent and shocking.
Dr. Nelder was startled and prop-
erly shocked by what he had seen,
and it made his life seem the more
academic. He knew how near-
sighted he had become, how he had
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lost a sense of the world; and Dr.
Nelder went home \vith a firm reso-
lution that he and his wife would
take a vacation. They both needed
a rest, some change from the nar-
rowed and withering routine of their
nves. and a reaffirmation of their
youth.
What in the world you driving
at?" his wife said to him.
She stood by the gas range stir-
ring thick shces of onion into a
kettle of potato soup.
"A vacation," he told her. "I've
been thinking the whole afternoon
that what we both need is a vaca-
tion."
"Vacation?" she said. "What
kind of a vacation?"
"A trip, maybe," he said quietly.
It was a beautiful day and I
was thinking we might go some-
where . . . .
"
"A trip?" his wife echoed. "But
how, on your salary?" And with
all the things that need to be done
around here? Besides, what kind of
vacation do you think it would be
for me? Probably just more and
more cleaning up.
"But I was thinking of just get-
ting away for a while," he said.
"W^e could take a bus up to the
mountains and just stay in a small
place. It wouldn't cost much. And
you wouldn't have to do anything
but rest."
He moved tow^ard her at the
stove; he wanted to slip his arm
around her waist. He thought of
sun still warm in the late afternoons
and grass still green under a clear
sky.
She stirred the soup.
"You haven't read the paper yet?"
she said.
He said nothing but \vent into
the dining room. W^hen the meal
was ready, they sat down at the
table and dipped spoons into the
soup. After several moments his
wife looked up and saw he was
not eating.
"Too hot? " she asked with a hint
of sharpness.
Yes, " he said.
He spoke with a vague expression
coming into his eyes. He thought
of the vacation, of green all over a
world of high mountains and some-
where a river and a cabin of rustic
logs ^- and even perhaps yet visible
on the highest peaks, a little snow.
He thought they were young again
and that they walked along a steep
bridle path in the woods and looked
out over the broad countryside.
Suddenly he wondered why he
had not been a farmer — a fanner
was always close to earth, close to
nature and the ways of life.
W^e II have to be realistic about
the vacation, I'm afraid," his wife
said. Her voice was sympathetic,
but steady. "W^e can't afford it, and
there's no point in dwelling upon
the fact further.
"
He did not look up, but stared
at a large limp slice of onion in
his soup.
It was true. He knew that they
could not really afford a vacation.
He had never made a good salary;
she had sometimes reminded him of
that. In her subtle, realistic way.
she had goaded him to work harder,
to apply himself and get ahead.
And he had worked, but in the end
he had merely buried himself under
the dusty debris of old books and
the endless rustlings of pedestrian
papers. Suddenly he thought thai
it was not the papers; really it was
his wife who had cut that young
impertinent ground from under him;
it was she who had made him
give up his ambitions; it was her
suffocating realism.
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TKey had finished the rest of their
meal in sullen silence, but when his
wife began to clear away the dishes,
he made a gesture to help. She
brushed him aside.
"You'll break something, " she
said, unsmihng. "Go in the other
room and read your paper.
"
He went into the hving room and
turned on the lamp beside his chair
and looked at the paper. He shook
the creases from the newsprint and
stared at the headhnes, but he had
grown too short-sighted and could
not see them clearly. They faded
before him into a blur of the same
ambiguous rusthngs and whispers
and the same vague knowledge of
other men leading mean hves and
stunning the world with their miser-
ly and infamous acts of violence
and rage. And even the rage seemed
dry as common dust now. He
looked at the paper without seeing
it in his hand. And he was sick
of it.
But suddenly the vision of green
grass, of late afternoon sunhght
and a fountain of vomiting seals
returned to him (What was that
word now? The word which had
come to him) , and of bare white
knees and sw^ift feet walking away.
He let the paper slip from his hands
and rose from the chair. He went
into the front hall and thrust his
arms into a light sport jacket. For
a moment now he hesitated as his
wife entered the hving room and
glanced toward him.
"Where you going? " she sai
"To the hbrary. Some reference
work. " He felt a quick tweak of
guilt and misgiving at his imperti-
nence.
"Oh. all right," his wife said.
He wished she had not said that.
She turned and began a search
behind cushions of the divan for her
basket of knitting, found it beneath
the paper and settled down to her
work. Her needles made a faint
brittle sound like the rustle and click
of twigs. For a minute longer he
watched half-hoping she would be-
come suspicious and raise some
objection to his going, but she did
not look up and Dr. Nelder turned
and went out the door.
He was sick of it.
But now he was a httle frightened,
too. He started to whistle an old
collegiate tune, but his lips produced
only a small parched squeak. All
the inexorable ambiguous and inti-
mate rustlings of the city seemed to
crowd in upon him as he walked on
through the darkening late-summer
streets toward the library.
REVEREND ANTHONY LAUCK, C.S.C, has just been appointed Head of
the Department of Art at Notre Dame University. His principal art work is
done in sculpture, although he also designs and teaches such subjects as
mosaic and stained glass. At present he is busy organizing an exhibition of
original Romanesque art for the Notre Dame autumn Festival of Art. **"^
VICTOR TEMMERMAN, sculptor, is Professor of Art at The Institut Su-
perior, Saint Lucas, Ghent, Belgium. (See page 6.)
OUR LADY OF THE UNIVERSITY In Anthony J. Lauck. C.S.C. Linu-ionr.
Kntiaiice to the Universitx of Notre l^ame. Indiana.
SACRED HEART by Victor Temmerman. Bronze.
Church at Hasselt. Belgium.
Sciences and Hnmanities
in tlie Modern World
In the past century we have witnessed striking developments in the world
of learning and radical shifts in the relative importance of various disci-
plines. We have seen, for instance, the emergence of new social sciences,
the great progress of physical sciences, and the assumption by these latter
disciplines of a pre-eminence held earlier by philosophy, theology, or philol-
ogy. Perennial problems about the relations of the various disciplines in
some total "hierarchy" and age-old tensions between major areas of study
have only continued, if indeed thy have not increased, with these develop-
ments.
Yet there has also been in more recent times a keener sense of inter-
dependence among many of the disciplines. There have been attempts, for
example, to adapt the method of the physical sciences to the social sciences
and even to the humanities. However, such adaptations have not always
been successful. Preoccupation with such borrowing has, in fact, often
led scholars to neglect the vigorous refinement of methods more proper to
their own fields. In general, though, it would appear that the increased
tempo of progress in human learning has forced most disciplines to an ever
oloser scrutiny of the persistent and fundamental questions of all study:
what object a particular discipline is actually studying; what the peculiar
character of its method is; what facts and values it is specifically concerned
with; what the relations are between these values and other human values.
Naturally these problems have had repercussions on teaching as well
as on speculation and research. In the past decade, especially, the spectre
of atomic destruction has given new urgency to thinking about the function
of science in the struggle for survival and the function of all disciplines in
the creation of something worthy of survival. The times, it is clear, demand
a more serious effort at dialogue between all the disciplines and a clarifica-
tion of their roles in a common educational effort.
The five papers which follow deal with some of these problems, though
not in any systematic or complete fashion. Dr. Hatzfeld gives a strong
statement of the differences which Pascal suggested between the spirit of
geometry and the spirit of finesse and urges the claims of the humanities
as an instrument of complete education. Dr. Crosson begins, paradoxically
enough, with the same distinction in Pascal, but he arrives at a radically
different concept of science—that it is a humanistic discipline.
The next two papers take a more general view of the commerce between
disciplines. Dr. Nemetz is concerned with some of the difficulties created
by certain pervasive attitudes of contemporary scientists and humanists;
he points to some possibilities of transcending these difficulties. Dr. Fisher
discusses the Catholic scholar's position with regard to revealed and human
truth. He then broadens the Thomistic understanding of this position to
suggest in what way every discipline has a definite autonomy.
Finally, Brother Fidelian writes about the difficulties of dialogue within
a discipline (rather than across disciplines), in this case, literary criticism.
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The Rnle of the Humanities
in a Cathnlic College
Helmut Hatzfeld
PASCAL MADE the priceless discovery that the human mind works on
three different levels with three quite different methods of penetration,
levels which are constitutionally superimposed upon one another but
strictly separated and not bridgeable. All three are necessary for the mental
integration of a balanced human mind. These methods of penetration were
called by Pascal the spirit of geometry, the spirit of refinement and the
spirit of charity; their objects are the sciences, the arts, and religion. Since
Pascal was speaking as a serious and cultured Christian, it is not out of
place to apply his categories to almost the same educational triad in the
curriculum of a Catholic college today. The application should make mean-
ingful and explicit what certainly lingers in the subconscious mind of every
intelligent college graduate.
In a responsible college the spirit of geometry is applied to the study
of mathematics and natural sciences only. It is the spirit of calculation, ab-
straction, and measurement; it provides laws and rules which enable men
to span bridges, launch satellites, split the atom, and discover galaxies. But
by its nature the spirit of geometry cannot be applied to the full human
life. It is only by coincidence that this spirit may arouse awe, cosmic anguish
and the awareness of a prime cause or prime mover. It is a spirit of cold
detachment, strict objectivity, and scientific exactness, priceless in its own
sphere. It moves in a world of truths without direct significance for life,
a world which the slightest infiltration of sentiment or philosophical specu-
lation endangers. Archimedes warned the non-initiated not to enter this
reserved area: "Ageometricos me eis ito." The non-initiated would be
shocked there by an inhuman language of signs and figures, a cool but
boundless curiosity and unhampered drive to technical perfection. The
tragic culmination is the automaton, the robot, the machine substituting
for man up to the translation of thought, the long distance missiles and
space navigation with long distance robot photographers—all reminiscent
of the Tower of Babel on another level. It is an open secret that the secular
college, taking the esprit de geometrie out of its proper domain and applying
it (contrary to Pascal's insight) to the whole of life, cannot help but produce
highly skilled technicians who are also positivists, materialists, pragmatists,
and determinists. Here the scientist-determinist is accepted without question
and replacement of psychology by robotology is mutely accepted.
A Catholic college averts this danger by keeping the scientific spirit
to the sphere to which it belongs, and by balancing it with what Pascal
calls the spirit of charity—supernatural religion. In the light of religion
the marvelous world of science is valued as a gift of God to be decoded
by the human mind. In this light the cosmos and the human mind appear
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as correlated creations of a Divine Love which has not condemned man to a
world of physical and biological laws, but reveals to him certain mysteries
concerning his special destiny. Religious education counteracts a science
which, left alone, threatens culture with a drift to moral and physical self-
destruction. The religious values, clearly appealing to the spirit of charity,
are life values—eternal values directed to the worship of God, to self-sanctifi-
cation and possible sanctification of the world. If the spiritual values some-
times help to create culture, the cultural achievements are by-products only
and as such have nothing to do with the spirit of charity. Products of
literature and art—whether subservient to another cause or used for them-
selves—belong to the spirit of refinement. For the cult of the spirit the
college has a particular division—the humanities, the division of human
refinement.
In what does this spirit of refinement consist, which only the humani-
ties can give? It consists first in the acquisition of a historical and philo-
sophical perspective which provides for a just, fair, and reliable judgment
of events and personalities through psychological assessment of facts, actions,
and social groups. A true understanding of history is very important, since
history provides lessons in the propriety and efficacy of human actions in
given circumstances. A critical judgment of history will not praise or
condemn actions from a narrow or superficial viewpoint or from political
bias, the case, for instance, with Nazi and Bolshevik historians. Rather it
leads to great vistas and vantage points which may easily link (though
tragically) the present East-West crisis to the battle of Salamis in 480 B.C.,
to the crusades of the Middle Ages, to the liberation of Spain from the
Moors, to the battle of Lepanto in 1571, to the defeat of the Turks near
Vienna in 1683. In all of these events there was at stake the same ideal,
namely, the defense of the Greek and the Christian concept of individual
liberty against the ideology of self-debasement and slavish subservience of
the masses. Besides providing such great perspectives, history also stimulates
a personal pondering on human decisions, choices, passions and visions, the
sacrifices of great personalities who are neither abject sinners nor remote
saints but something like ourselves. The best understanding of the com-
plexity of history often comes from works of literature. It is, for instance,
from Dante's Divina Commedia that we learn even better than from his
political treatise De Monorchia the delicacy of the relations between Pope
and Emperor during the Middle Ages, and on a larger scale those between
Church and State at any time. History offers strange lessons about great
political visions and petty political interests, about the elusiveness of con-
cepts like clericalism and anti-clericalism.
The refinement acquired by the humanities through literature consists
less in the critical use of literary works as historic documents than in the
capacity of appraising aesthetic, i.e. artistic and literary values. The
acquisition of this kind of critical judgment is bound to lead to a mature
taste, certainly another worth-while goal of the humanities. This artistic
taste has nothing to do with art for art's sake nor with snobbishness or
beatnick-mindedness or that relativistic fad of finding beauty everywhere
—
in the products of the primitives as much as in Greek sculpture, in a signifi-
cant classic as well as in a bestseller. On the contrary, it provides a forma-
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tion of rectitude on the aesthetical level comparable to the formation of a
right conscience on the moral level. These two domains come so close to
one another that the French dramatist Desmarets-de-Saint-Sorlin did not
hesitate to declare that cultivated literary taste necessarily leads to a kind
of intellectual ascetism. He meant this in the sense that refined literary
sensibility will reject, without the necessity of an Index or outside prohibi-
tion, the sensational, the cheap, the superficial, and the morally ambiguous
and thus create by dint of a purified taste a climate of cleanliness, of purity,
of dignity, and excellence.
The books to be studied in the humanities are those which cure the
restlessness of the body and the mind with an interior catharsis. The effect
of studying great tragedies and aesthetically significant literature is that
one becomes convinced of one's own frailty and the virtual dangers coming
from such situations as brought about the fall of the tragic hero. Great
literature is irreplaceable. It dramatizes problems and truths through im-
agination and symbolization in concrete and overwhelming examples. Ex-
istentialists and phenomenologists, by an understandable exaggeration, con-
sider literature even a substitute for abstract philosophy. Literature actually
offers insights into human conditions wdth quite another intensity than the
factual cases of history, the clinical cases of psychology, and the generaliza-
tions and abstractions of metaphysics.
Taste for great literature necessarily develops more and more a sense
for poetry, third asset of the humanities. In poetry human feelings and
cravings and excellence in the use of language meet in a unique fusion.
Here taste develops that disinterested pleasure which teaches the sense
of form, style, and harmony, recognized first analytically and then intui-
tively in the artifact. One who enjoys literature as art discovers a complex
in which thought, feeling, and imagination merge into a higher form of
reality. The student of literature discovers that language is more than a
means of direct communication : on a higher level it is a means of expression
in which language acquires a particular distinction with new arrangements
of sound and meaning—unique and spiritually rewarding. Psychologically,
good poetry demands a concentration of mind and heart and leads to an
absorption of the spirit of the kind known by the research worker in the
best moments when he is close to a discovery or in prayer when it leads
to the deepest recollection.
A Catholic college in its humanities section is a permanent demonstra-
tion that the finest things of nature are an invitation to the realm of grace
and not a hindrance to it. Poetry refines the student's understanding of
language and shows him the difference between the virtue of stylistic am-
biguity in the poetic symbol and the curse of ambiguity on the lexical every-
day level. The choices in reading made by the college, the teacher, and the
student according to individual preference give him an elasticity which other
more fixed and impersonal subjects cannot give. A comparison between
different literatures and languages teaches the student the spirit of the
nations through the w^ritten and spoken word and shows him that French
intellectuality is different from the Anglo-Saxon spirit of practical organiza-
tion and from Spanish daydreaming and German idealism. Poetry is a
key to the other arts in the sense that all the arts are transfigurations of
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life through aesthetic forms and are, therefore, poetic by implication. The
employment of color, stone, or sound rather than language does not destroy
the analogous basis of the creative process and the artistic goal. Poetry con-
tains in its own substance all sorts of elements applicable to the discovery
of the analogies in the sister arts. Here emerge avenues to a comparative
or truly humanistic art appreciation.
Beyond understanding criticism, the humanities convey to the whole
personality all those accomplishments which strike one in history and the
arts as likable and desirable qualities. These accomplishments are not
virtues and do not form the saint but form the gentlemen in a democracy
as they formed the knight in the Middle Ages and the courtier in the
Renaissance. The qualities of a gentleman are courtesy, gentleness, elegance,
graciousness and civility, the gift of conversation, and the use of cultured
forms of language.
It makes a big difference whether the customs of a cultured life develop
gradually from a humanistic college education or whether they are acquired
for the occasion from Emily Post—just as it makes a difference whether a
student has acquired an inner flair for what is objectionable in literature
or whether he avoids such books only because he is told that they are sup-
posed to be bad. But we have to understand that the humanities, as we
have described them thus far, do not in themselves complete the formation
of the college graduate. The humanities certainly do not provide the young
man a capsuled art and science of living; they have already done much if,
in the words of Robert M. Hutchins, they prepare the student to educate
himself and make good use of his leisure time.
One cannot avoid linking the humanities to humanism, and humanism
was almost a synonym for the study of Latin and Greek to the end of the
nineteenth century. Today, a Catholic college ought to be the place to re-
vive classical studies as far as that is still possible. Strange to say, Ave
live in a moment when the whole orbis catholicus has been called by the
highest authority to participate not only in the liturgy but in the Latin of
the liturgy. With the possible revival of the study of Latin, even on such a
small basis, the ancient literatures may again appear more attractive in
their original than in translation, and since the real treasures of literary
antiquity are hidden in Greek culture. Homer and Sophocles may still be
an incentive to the study of Greek. It is a great experience to see in the
originals (not in the hastily read translations) the high level of humanity
and humaneness in the parental, conjugal, neighborly, and political relations
of those pagan Greeks as described in the Odyssey— all under the eyes of the
gods or sub specie aeternitatis. It is also appalling to realize from Greek
tragedy that men and gods alike are helpless against a moira, a destiny
which seems to reign arbitrary and almost absurd in a world without re-
demption.
The humanists of the secular college (as they did during the Renais-
sance) make bold today to share with the Greeks a relativistic ethics of
compromise based on exclusively human relations, totally rejecting the
eternal destiny and responsibility of the individual soul. Jean-Paul Sartre
has revamped ancient tragedy in a revolutionary Promethean sense debunk-
ing the divine by vulgar devices and a barbarian language. Sartre's scoffing
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at a world without finality is a real challenge to a Christian humanism which
with its redeemed sensibility, can read ancient myth for its own enrichment.
The Christian humanist recognizes the stress on the human, the humane and
the humanistic, even the humanitarian, as defensible secundum quid and as an
excellent basis for human relations with all men in a pluralistic society and
in the civitas terrena. He accepts the stress on the enigmatic and unexplain-
able in the cosmos and in the biological and psychological mazes of man,
not as an absurdity but as a paradox and as a mystery. Paradox and mystery
open by necessity and with an ineluctable analogy the door to Faith.
Recalling at this point Pascal's thesis that there is no bridge between
the spirit of refinement in the humanities and the spirit of charity given
only by Christ and the Christian religion, we can see that well-directed hu-
manities in a Catholic college reach their goal on the highest level, if they
enable students to see this Pascalian situation clearly and not get lost trying
to bridge the abyss between the two with meaningless spans of human con-
struction. On the spiritual level charity makes the heart of man "restless
until it finds rest in God," while on the intellectual level the humanities make
his mind poised, clear, and balanced.
Science as a Humanistic Discipline
• F. J. Crosson
IF
WE BEGIN by adverting to Pascal's famous opposition of the geo-
metrical spirit and the spirit of finesse, this essay may be said to sug-
gest that the opposing of these spirits is not the opposing of the scientific
spirit to the humanistic spirit, but the opposing of two forms of humanistic
activity. There is then an opposition, but it lies not merely in two dif-
ferent approaches to the things of human experience, but in a birurcation
deep in human nature itself, and which may be indicated by pointing to
mathematics and politics (the latter in a broad and classical sense).
The tension (if one may use such a strong word in speaking of what
may appear unlikely opposites) between mathematics and politics goes back
at least to the Pythagorean Brotherhood (which, be it noted in passing,
was a religious brotherhood^) and to Plato, who in the Republic prescribes
the mathematical curriculum in order to raise the minds of his students
from the world of human things to another world.^
For a more recent expression of this tension, one may cite the recent
work of Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition: "The sciences today have
been forced to adopt a 'language' of mathematical symbols which, though
^ See the comments on this in Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers (New York, 1959),
pp. 33-39.
* Republic. 525.
Science as a Humanistic Discipline 13
it was originally meant only as an abbreviation for spoken statements, now
contains statements that in no way can be translated back into speech."
She continues,
The reason why it may be wise to distrust the political
judgment of scientists qua scientists is not primarily their
lack of "character"—that they did not refuse to develop
atomic weapons—or their naivete—that they did not un-
derstand that once these weapons were developed they would
be the last to be consulted about their use—but precisely
the fact that they move in a world where speech has lost
its power.'^
Miss Arendt goes on to state the aim of her book as follows: "What I pro-
pose therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are
doing."4
Her words here echo some remarks on symbolism in mathematics by
Alfred North Whitehead.
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-
books and by eminent people when they are making speeches,
that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we
are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization
advances by extending the number of important operations
which we can perform without thinking about them.*^
These introductory remarks may be summarized by quoting one last
phrase from Miss Arendt. Referring to the language of mathematical science,
she says, "There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great
relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man insofar as he is not a
political being, whatever else he may be."^ The contention of these pages
is precisely that this "something else" in man finds one of its most funda-
mental expressions in the sciences, and that however different from or
opposed to man's wordly or political activities it be, it is a dimension of
his being whose suppression truncates the human spirit.
* * *
Let us consider two fundamental objections addressed to the notion
of science as a humanistic discipline. One is that science (prototypically
mathematical physics) does not deal with the human world, with the world
of values, of beauty, of homecomings and tragedy. The evidence for this
objection is ancient: the familiar human world had shadows cast on it by
Democritus: "By convention colored, by convention sweet, by convention
bitter; in reality only atoms and the void."" I mention Democritus only
to point out that this objection as addressed to science today is only a more
particular form of the opposition between nature and convention, or be-
tween theory and praxis. Theory has always said to praxis, things are not
what they seem. In so far as this objection is a special case, it is funda-
^Op. cit. (New York, 1959), p. -4.
*Ibid., p. 6.
^Introduction to Matkemctics (New York, 1948), pp. 41-42.
« Op. cit., p. 4.
^ Dials, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1922), II, 97.
14 Four Quarters
mentally both logically and chronologically prior to the development of
modern science.
The second objection is really a corollary of the first, though it is one
more frequently heard, namely that science is inimical to human values,
to the values of finesse, and it is on this basis that the sciences and the
humanities are often opposed.
In general, the rejoinder to these objections will be to maintain that
science does deal with the human world, the world of immediate everyday
experience, and that the type of objectivity which it pursues, while eliminat-
ing those elements which are data only for the spirit of finesse, is none the
less rooted in the exigencies and dynamisms of the structure of the human
person.
* * »
The earliest of the modern encounters between the common sense world
and the natural sciences, and the one most commonly referred to, was the
elaboration of the renaissance astronomies, beginning with the Copernican
revolution. There are few incidents which have given rise to such persistent
mythology as the work of Copernicus and Kepler.^ The notion that the
new astronomy meant the demotion or effacement of man's importance is
commonplace—and wrong. It certainly meant the overturning of a powerful
and ancient Weltanschauung, but far from "all coherence" being gone (in
Donne's phrase), far from the diminution of man's stature, it led to the
very apotheosis of the human spirit. One example: a recent study of the
seventeenth century controversy over the decay of nature states: "... the
new astronomy of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo revealed yet another
sign of the broken harmony of the universe."^ The unconscious irony in
this statement lies in the fact that the very title of one of Kepler's greatest
works was the Harmonies of the Universe.
Alfred Noyes in what may not be good poetry, but is accurate histori-
cally, expresses it this way:
... I wish that old Copernicus could see
How, through his truth, that once dispelled a dream,
Broke the false axle-trees of heaven, destroyed
All central certainty in the universe
And seemed to dwarf mankind, the spirit of man
Laid hold on law ....
And mounting, slowly, surely, step by step,
Entered into its kingdom and its power.^*^
In the seventeenth century, man was able for the first time to transcend
the problematic whose limits were circumscribed by the earth and things
as seen from the earth. But this does not mean, and never will mean, that
the resulting "objectivity" ceases to be rooted in human perspectives: we
will never be so "objective" as to pay equal attention to equal portions of
* Perhaps a rival is Galileo and the Tower of Pisa experiment: cf. Lane Cooper,
Aristotle, Galileo and the Tower of Pisa (Ithaca, 1935).
•Victor Harris, All Coherence Gone (Chicago, 1949), p. 2.
10 ^Vatchers of the Sky (New York, 1922), p. 135.
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mass or space throughout the universe.^^ This fertile transposition of frames
of reference in thought, difficult though it was for men of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, does not seem so strange today—few if any "human-
ists" object to explaining the motions of the planets by the heliocentric
theory. The later instances of transcending the perspectives of the every-
day world however have been harder to follow, or at any rate have not yet
been assimilated. Non-Euclidean geometries, for example, or infinite sets,
or quantum mechanics. The foundations of modern mathematics—not
merely its far-removed conclusions—are based on a systematic generaliza-
tion or formalization which empties them of direct empirical or even im-
aginative reference.^"
It is tempting to characterize the formalism of modern science, as
Polanyi tends to do, in terms of a commitment: the inclination or decision
to allow our symbols to lead us on, to allow them their full generality, their
full amplitude. A deliberately paradoxical reference to this is Bertrand
Russell's well-known remark that "mathematics is the subject in which we
never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is
true." But it is by following out its first intuitions, by entrusting them
to a formal system, that modern science has been led to both its transcend-
ing of the everyday world and its overwhelming achievements. We entrust
the guidance of our thoughts to conceptions which we believe to possess a
rationality beyond our first appreciation of them. The predictions made
on the basis of thoroughly formalized theory of atomic structure have been
consistently and strikingly verified.-*^'^
Nor should this formalism be viewed as merely a mechanical shorthand
which enables us to elaborate the consequences of a given hypothesis or of
given axioms more surely and in more detail than intuitive apprehension
could. One of the most stunning theorems of modern logic and mathe-
matics—^the incompleteness theorem of Kurt Godel—shows that this is not
the case.
Godel proved in 1931 that not only can there not be an absolute proof
of consistency for any deductive (formal) system in which the whole of
arithmetic is expressible, but also that there is an endless number of true
arithematical statements which cannot be formally deduced from any
specified set of axioms. To put it in a concrete way, no computer can be
devised which would be capable of proving (i.e., deriving from a set of
axioms) all true arithemetical statements.-'^'*
It is not then suggested that the scientist abandons himself to formal-
ism in the sense of an impersonal calculus of symbols. The elaboration of
the formalism is always guided by an "inarticulate apprehension" (intuition
if you will) of the heuristic function. Sometimes this apprehension is orient-
ed by the values of beauty and elegance, rather than immediate fruitful-
" Cf. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago, 1958), p. 3.
'= For an example of the formalism to which I refer, see Sir Arthur Eddington's
discussion of the theory of groups in New Pathways in Science (Cambridge, 1935).
" Cf. Polanyi, op. cit., p. 148-9.
" For an informal presentation of Godel's incompleteness theorem, see E. Nagel and
J. Newman, Godel's Proof (New York, 1958).
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ness.^^ Sometimes it anticipates the formalism by searching to express a
regularity or rationality in nature which is not at first seen in the symbols,
for example, Kepler's third law, or Bode's "law",^^ or Einstein's formula-
tion of the special theory of relativity. The latter is usually presented as a
response to Michelson-Morley experiment, but in fact the role of this ex-
periment in Einstein's thought was negligible, ^^ and in fact he had reached
its results by analysis prior to its publication.
Even where technical results precede theoretical innovation, they are
often not sufficient to produce the latter by simple correlation and inference.
An example from a different field may be enlightening here:
The features which make up the Gothic style are .... the
pointed arch, the flying buttress, and the rib vault. Not
one of them is a Gothic invention .... What the Gothic
style brought to these motifs was their combination for a
new esthetic purpose. This purpose was to enliven inert
masses of masonry, to quicken spatial motion, to reduce a
building to a seeming system of innervated lines of action.
These esthetic advantages are infinitely more significant for
an understanding of the Gothic style than whatever techni-
cal advantages the use of ribs, flying buttresses, and pointed
arches may have meant.-*^^
The transcending of the world of immediate experience by modern
science never means the extirpation of its roots in that world, nor of the
values of the spirit of finesse and intuitive apprehension which frequently
seem more appropriate there. Never the less, the following out of the mathe-
matical formalization of the sciences of nature has led to the realization
that it can be dealt with—explained, represented, predicted—in ways un-
suspected by earlier centuries. The scientific understanding of the world
emerges by way of a radical modification of or change of perspective from
the natural understanding of the world.
* * «
A second major objection to the notion of science as a humanistic
discipline is that it is inimical to human values.
The most direct way to respond to this would be to consider the premise
on which it appears to be based, namely, that if only "atoms and the Void"
exist, then the values by which we guide our lives are not objective, not
real. Far from being an objection or accusation, this seems to be true.
Values are not objective, in the scientific sense of that term: their mode of
existence lies between that of subject and object, and if science abstracts
from the personal levels of meaning of its object, it will necessarily eliminate
the value-phenomena.
This is why science is always closely associated with the "atoms and
the void" view of the universe. The objectivity of science is made possible
" Polanyi, op. cit., p. 147.
" Koestler, op. cit., p. 549.
" Polanyi, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
^* N. Pevsner, An Outline of European Architecture (London: Penguin edition,
1957), p. 75.
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only by ignoring those modes of presence which involve the subject as a
constituent element of the meaning of the data. Hence the general effort
of the positive sciences is to formulate propositions which can establish
consensus without regard to the value responses of the subject.
In fact, however, the subject and his values are involved as a condition
of the scientific enterprise in a number of ways.
First, with respect to the criterion of relevant or significant data. In
popular writing, this question is generally ignored, and one gets the im-
pression of science as a monolithic discipline which has been seeking better
and better explanations of the facts since the time of Thales. In reality, the
very notion of the "facts" is extremely relative—relative to the conception
of 1) what it is to explain, and 2) what needs to be explained. The ideal of
a complete theory in physics is not fixed because the idea of what has to
be accounted for is not fixed. For classical physics, the identity of gravita-
tional and inertial mass was not curious, it was not a source of wonder.
For relativity theory, it is a fact to be explained. One might say that meta-
physics differs from physical science in assuming that existence has to be
explained. The wonder about the unaccounted-for aspects of experience
moves in general at a deeper level in philosophy, but it is not the less present
and recurrent in physics.^^ Thus, the determination of atomic weights for
which W. T. Richards was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1914 was described
by a physicist in 1932 as "of little interest and significance as the determina-
tion of the average weight of a collection of bottles".-*^
Another role of the subject as the conditioner of the scientific enterprise
is in the application of "extra-scientific" principles to the explanations. The
most notable example of this is the principle of economy ("Occam's Razor"),
which has no justification in the area of scientific investigation itself. If
it is to be founded, in the sense of assuring that the simpler explanation
will be the more correct one, it can receive such a foundation only on a
philosophical or ideological level. (Another example is the Lysenko doc-
trine on genetics in Marxist biology.)^ Actually, for all its basic importance,
the principle of economy is not always determinant. Copernicus required
more cycles and epicycles than Ptolemy to account for the motions of the
heavenly bodies.--
Perhaps the most personal of such conditioning elements is the acquisi-
tion and exercise of the skills necessary to original work on the part of the
scientific investigator. The ability to perceice what is relevant—e.g. in cloud
chamber photographs—or what is elegant and beautiful—e.g. in a mathe-
matical proof—is derived from the assimilation of these skills to the point
where, by their instrumentality, the scientist accedes to a type of significance
which cannot be mechanically translated from the empirical elements which
compose it.
"Stephen Toulmin, Philosophy of Science (London, 1958), pp. 116-8.
" Polanyi, op. cit., p. 136.
"Philip Frank, Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; 1957), ch. L
'- Koestler, op. cit., p. 192.
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I believe that we come closest here to the traditionally humanistic
roots of science, namely its relation to the liberal arts. Galileo wrote in a
famous passage,
Science is written in that great book which stands con-
tinually open before our eyes—I mean the universe. But
it cannot be understood if one does not understand the
characters in which it is written. It is written in the lan-
guage of mathematics, and its characters are triangles,
circles, and other geometrical figures. Without knowledge
of these we cannot understand its speech and can only
wander vainly through an obscure labyrinth.^
Science, then, is acquired through a discipline of symbols, a knowledge of
language, which is to say it is the work of a liberal art, and itself a liberal
knowledge. A non-verbal linguistic art, to be sure, but one which is our
time has reaped the greatest triumphs of the liberal arts. Surely we have
little to compare with the ancients in the verbal linguistic arts.
The verbal arts may indeed be those most important to political man,
to man in his commerce with his fellows, but the non-verbal liberal arts
have been the source of a typically modern humanism.
The traditional humanistic view tends to characterize humanism in terms
of its concern with and preservation of the values of "finesse", the human
values. I do not understand this to mean that the humanistic disciplines or
activities have man as their theme or object. Literature, for example, I take
to be concerned with beauty, and not with man. Aristotle, in his Poetics,
does not advert to the "tragic vision" of Sophocles, or the "profound in-
sights" of Aeschylus, but analyzes the power of a drama in terms of its
form,^of the way it is made, rather than what it "says".^
In general, the sense of these remarks has been that human values are
not and cannot be the focus of (natural) scientific investigation, because of
the type of abstraction or insight which defines its level of approach, but
that human values nonetheless sustain and guide it. Moreover, it is ultimate-
ly the phenomena of the world of everyday experience which it seeks to ex-
plain or account for.
The nub of the difference lies in the character of "explanation" conse-
quent upon the diverse levels of approach to these phenomena. Even within
a particular science, these differences may manifest themselves, for example
in these comments by a Gestalt psychologist on the methods of empirical
psychologists.
One of the fundamental methods of natural science is analy-
sis. The psychologist, therefore, confronted with a complex
field of vision . . . feels naturally inclined to analyze this
field into smaller and smaller entities whose properties he
may study with more ease and with more hope of clear
^' From II Saggiatore, quoted in O. Bird, "Science and Mathematics in the Liberal
Arts Curriculum," in Journal of General Education, X (Jan., 19S7), p. 24.
** For the meaning of the term "form" in literary theory which is assumed here,
see "Form" in Shipley's Dictionary of World Literature.
^° Why many modern humanists do discuss the "tragic vision," etc., is another
question too large to enter into here.
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results than an immediate consideration of the whole field
would yield. Generally he does not ask himself what this
procedure purports and if, perhaps, the term analysis is
rather ambiguous ....
Somehow, it is true, our observations also meant an
analysis of the field. In our analysis, however, we have
followed the natural and evident structures of the field
instead of dissolving it theoretically and arbitrarily into
minute local things which nobody ever sees.-^
It remains true, nevertheless, that the desire to recover a unity beyond
the opposition of the sciences and the humanities is keenly felt. Bohr's at-
tempt to erect a philosophy upon the complementarity principle suggests
that the difference of perspectives presents itself at times as a kind of civil
war, which both sides would like to end with a truce, if not an integral
synthesis. For my part, I believe that greater understanding could ameliorate
and even eliminate the antithetical attitudes so much in evidence. But I
do not believe that a synthesis in anything like the ancient and medieval sense
is possible. It is possible to include both within a larger perspective, but
the two will not thereby constitute a single universe of discourse .
Science and the Humanities
• Anthony Nemetz
PROFITABLE discussion about the relation of science and the humanities
presupposes that these terms be clearly understood and precisely de-
fined. To proceed on the assumption that there is common agreement
on the nature and scope of these disciplinary concepts is erroneous. There
are indeed current tensions between the sciences and the humanities, and
there is no hope of easing these tensions through discussion if either party
insists on unilateral acceptance of his classificatory schema of the sciences.
It is impossible to derive mutually satisfactory definitions of basic terms
like science and humanities from the privileged portion of either term. In
short, what constitutes a satisfactory definition already involves a disciplinary
bias. As an alternative to presumptive definition as the basis of discussion,
I would like to present some current attitudes and seldom spoken suspicions
which serve to locate or isolate the areas of opposition which can be agreed
upon. Then I want to propose one possible way of fruitfully discussing
these. I intend to outline these attitudes in an extreme form, perhaps even
to the point of caricature.
The first such attitude turns on the procedural methods of the natural
" W. Kohler, "Some Tasks of Gestalt Psychology" in Psych-ologies of 1930 ed.
Murchison (Worcester, 1930) p. 147.
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scientist. Scientists are justly proud of their methods— methods which
have allowed for a continuous and cumulative progress in knowledge
and understanding. These methods convince the scientist of the significance
of his every task and assure him of the inevitable progress of his discipline.
But the very success of these methods leads some scientists to see the adoption
of their methods as a touchstone of intellectual progress. It is a common
attitude among scientists that the humanities are less developed than the
sciences. The physical scientists' minimization of the social sciences is
evidence of this attitude. Again the real problem is whether the social
sciences would gain significantly by importing the methods of the natural
sciences.
To put the matter another way, the humanities feel threatened by what
they see as a Messianic complex on the part of the physical sciences. It
should be noted that the humanists' suspicion is grounded less in the
sciences themselves than in the logical positivists' philosophy of science.
It is the positivists' philosophy of science which dichotomizes the intellectual
world into cognitive and non-cognitive, and it is this same philosophy of
science which restricts the meaning of evidence and argument to the area
of public testability and confirmation. A final way of putting the methodo-
logical issue concerns the precise or exact sciences. The use of mathematics
as a language and the procedures of logical analysis give the physical sciences
a precision unmatched in the humanities. But precision in language may
well be a variable relative to disciplinary purposes, and consequently not
the touchstone of over-all disciplinary importance.
The question of disciplinary importance is the second broad area of
tension between the sciences and the humanities. When one speaks about
the importance of a given discipline, one is prescinding from intrinsic
methodology and introducing the problem of the relation of the discipline
to society and its members. A further issue raised by the same question turns
on the norms by which the social effectiveness and employment of a disci-
pline is judged. Scientists are outspokenly in favor of the humanities, and
the humanities have a decided stake in the development of the sciences.
But the grounds of interest are not common. The reason for the difference
of concern is due in part to the behavior of the humanists themselves—at
least in the way that the sciences interpret the humanities. In the extreme
view, the humanities have argued to the existence of an elite culture of which
they are the exclusive custodians and to which they are the principle con-
tributors. In a less strident way, a non-partisan could easily get the im-
pression that the humanities affect a studied uselessness whenever they are
asked to characterize their social utility. They speak of the fullness of a
man and his enriched life, but they often do so with a tone of social dis-
interestedness. In this aspect of the case the opposition between the sciences
and the humanities emerges more clearly. Disinterestedness or detachment
is an essential part of the scientist's creed, but the scientist combines a per-
sonal detachment from his results with genuine social concern for science
in the sense that science as a discipline is something rather public. The
scientist often regards the rewards of the humanities as something quite
private—something that belongs essentially to the leisure hours rather than
to the concerns of the day. No matter how distasteful this estimate is to
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the humanities, it is in large measure a face they themselves have put in the
mirror. The humanities can and do reply that the common good is well
served if the private good—especially the private cultural good—is well
served. But this argument has not caught the public's fancy or its favor,
and the public may well be correct in holding that argument suspect.
This last line of opposition delineates the very core of the problem
—
namely, the image we have or make of science or the humanities as a disci-
pline. Harlow Shapley in an article on the intellectual stance of the future
says: "Our dealing with the future will take both logical analysis and im-
aginative poetry; it will take science and the humanities intermingled."
This may well be the case, but the wisdom of the race suggests careful
scrutiny of the intentions of the participants—especially the intentions
of the marriage broker. The point is that the image or self-image of the
respective disciplines determines the proper functional interpretation.
More concretely, the humanities have for some years advertised them-
selves as good in themselves, or have promised that knowledge of the humani-
ties, like virtue, is its own reward. But something good in itself cannot
be viewed as functional also without leaving the impression that the good
in itself really means good in itself as a tool. The reason that the humanities
have seen themselves as self-vindicating is because they have always thought
of themselves as bringing an ordered intelligibility to the real world. Poets,
no less than physicists, have thought of themselves as logical and analytical,
and in direct touch and communion with the world of everyday experience.
Probably nothing irritates a man in the humanities as much as being viewed
as a dreamer of dreams with which he builds a paradise for his own fanatic
sect. The very idea of intellectual discipline is seen in quite different terms
by the sciences and the humanities. It has been stylish for some time to
think of science as a public activity, and in some cases this overtness has
been included in the very definition of science. When a scientist explains
or predicts an event, his laws—understood as relational statements—do
indeed result in an ordered view of experience. In this sense, science (like
the humanities) sees itself as both discovering and endowing experience
with meaning and order. In the post-Newtonian world, the terms employed
by the scientist were basically sets of external relations—or at least were
interpreted that way. By external relations, I mean terms which are in some
way functionally available for public inspection. It is tempting to make an
oversimplification and say that both science and the humanities see them-
selves as bringing an ordered intelligibility to the world—science in terms
of external relations (force and mass, etc.) and the humanities in terms of
internal relations (imagination, insight, etc.). However neat this would
be, it would be false. Science has come to the point where it is no longer
preoccupied simply with prying loose the secrets of nature; rather, the
mission of science today is equally one of giving nature some secret to keep.
Such a task clearly demands more than a clear head and a hard nose;
it demands creativity and imagination, aesthetic finesse, and poetic daring.
This is why we now hear so much about the needed togetherness of the
sciences and the humanities. For example, Derek Price sees an urgent need
for a program called "The Scientific Humanities" which would remove the
scientific illiterateness from the humanities and make relevant to the sciences
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(in a way intelligible to them) the insights of the humanities. I do not intend
to discuss Price's proposal at any length, but only to quote its purpose
which is: "What the old humanities did for classical learning, the humanities
of today must do for science." Whether everyone agrees on this formulation
of the past is not as important as the admission that there is a genuine need
to reduce the opposition between the sciences and the humanities—funda-
mentally because both may gain from the exchange. But in what terms can
an unobjectionable exchange be made? Reconsideration and refinement of
methodological procedures is an internal affair to each set of disciplines.
Social functions and effectiveness can hardly be the subject of fruitful ex-
change, unless it is also assumed that one member of the discussion will
deliberately violate his own interests. The image of a given discipline as
seen by its practitioner may be factually interesting and enlightening but
cannot serve as the basis of continuing dialogue.
All of this is not very constructive, but I do have a suggestion for a
continuing discussion between the sciences and the humanities. By way of
introduction to my suggestion, let me quote Perry Bridgman: "Now these
things, which make the individual scientist go, are all deeply human traits,
possessed in greater or less degree by all men, in particular by the humanist.
It seems to me that the drives which make the humanist go are much like
[those of the scientist." If this suggestion is to be more than a truism, it
must be translated into common issues and concerns. However, to make the
translation into common concerns demands that we avoid making the trans-
lation into specifically disciplinary terms. It is one thing to admit to the
community of "drives," and quite another to interpret those drives in
terms of a specific psychology. What I propose instead is to consider the
common drives in terms that are not specifically disciplinary but which
could find disciplinary applications.
Let us begin with the basic drive in both science and the humanities.
Aristotle said it: "All men by nature desire to know." He added that to
know means to grasp the causes of things. I think it wise to translate the
notion of causal knowledge into a general form—e.g., "to know means to
deal in disciplinary fashion with the data of experience." Discipline here
means the fixing of insights in symbolic form. In short, a discipline con-
sists in a set of ordered symbols signified in any linguistic form—mathe-
matics included. To be sure, there is a question of how symbols are related
to experience, but this is a variable for each discipline. The basic issue
is why fix insights into symbols? I raise this question because symbols (and
all language) are something artificial and conventional—a substitution
instance for experience. Consequently, any discipline is the artful manipu-
lation or organization of signs of actual or possible experience. To make
a discipline or to work within any discipline is to artfully or aesthetically
transform segments of experience. The world and our experience of it is
a continuous affair, and we must freeze the process or anesthetize the flow
of consciousness to reflect on any aspect of the world. Symbols act in just
that fashion. Symbols—both signs and concepts—paradoxically do for us
what we cannot do for ourselves. Men desiring to learn, recognize their
own changing conditions and create a discipline or science. Such creation
is basically an anthropomorphic hypostasis. Men realize that they are not
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equally fitted to each day's tasks and that the vagaries of passion and pain,
of organic need and social demand, all tend to make thought and thinking
discontinuous. To overcome both distractions and interruptions, men in-
vest symbols with constancy and arrange them in patterns to provide a
principle of continuity. In short, men make their symbols behave as men
ideally would like to perform.
The reason we try to make proofs, inferences, or probability calculi
in any disciplinary sense is to exhibit an inherent set of necessary or probable
relations. Yet it certainly should be possible to grasp in some intuitive way
a conclusion without going through the formality of arranging the premises.
The initial point of such construction is not a substitute for the ability to
grasp the conclusion; rather it is a way of facilitating the release of intuitive
grasp from the uncertainties of time itself. Once a proof has been made, we
can, as it were, always recapture what once we saw. But not only that, for
the process of inference also leads to new insights precisely because it
divests experience of inevitable temporal mutations, and so allows us to
see relations among phenomena or among aspects of a phenomena in a
stillness which is not native either to the phenomena or to us.
I know that it sounds self-contradictory to say that disciplinary con-
struction and development is not native to us but that, nevertheless, we do
it. But then, neither are cars, air conditioners, or men's deodorants in-
digenous to the human person. Yet he makes and uses them. In short, I
am trying to say that a science or discipline is not native to us as is our ex-
perience. On the contrary, what is native is the desire to know, and what
is further native, is an impatience to know constantly in a constant manner.
To be sure, there is scattered ingenuity in the race which artfully expedites
the fulfillment of such desires.
The initial proposal to put the sciences and the humanities in a position
of possible dialogue is to view all organized intellectual efforts as aesthetic
matters, without, of course, employing a given theory of aesthetics.
This approach is more than an ad hoc proposal. My reasons for think-
ing so are, in a way, found both in the history of disciplines and in the biogra-
phy of each individual. Consider for a moment the fact that children who
have a minimum understanding of language love to listen to fairy tales.
Children begin to learn about the world through these little allegories.
Mother Goose, Grim, and Aesop tell children more about the world than
do our most developed factual disciplines. Children are by nature allegorical
animals. Now without making any specious analogies to ontogeny and phy-
logeny, let me say that the history of the development of disciplines does
seem to follow a similar pattern. Before astronomy there was astrology, and
before chemistry there was alchemy. Poetry is naturally prior to science
in the sense of any organized factual discipline.
The significance of this point can be put another way. Every science
and discipline has two aspects which I want to call the doctrinal and the
prophetic. By doctrinal is meant the specific method, key concepts, and
appropriate conclusions, facts or data found in the workings of a science.
By prophetic I mean the overarching hypotheses, assumptions, and principles
under which the discipline itself is organized. For example, the assumption
that mathematics could be used as the language of science revolutionized
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the very nature of physics as a discipline. Yet this assumption was not war-
ranted or inferable from anything that had been done in natural philosophy
prior to Newton. This is true not only of physics, but of every discipline.
Genuine creativity in intellectual life is basically a matter of myth-making
—
a matter of a new formulation of ideals or a matter of stating ideas which
are regulative of disciplinary aspirations and their consequent documenta-
tion. The prophetic function of a discipline is a matter of myth-making,
of formulating ideals, or specifying regulative ideas. For present purposes
these phrases are synonymous, although in fact they are only functionally
analogous. The important point is that their function is essentially poetic
in an almost Platonic sense—for these are the products of men who are a
race apart: men who are inspired. Plato calls the poets "out of their wits,"
and if wits here mean acute disciplinary perception, he is correct. For the
creation or transformation of a new discipline is never itself a disciplinary
matter, and this is an instance of what I mean by saying that poetry is
naturally prior to science. Poetry is equally prior to any humanistic disci-
pline, the only difference being that poetry in a disciplinary sense is usually
catalogued with the humanities (a fact which is not relevant to this dis-
cussion) .
The difficulties of the matter can now be stated. The sciences see a
definite need for importing the traditional humanitarian concerns with in-
sight and poetic imagination. Yet the humanities are either deeply reluctant
or have not found a way to export these architectonic concerns except in the
framework of their traditional disciplines. Unfortunately, the disciplinary
concerns of the humanities—such as literary criticism—are of no disciplin-
ary value to the sciences (or at least of no immediate value). On the other
hand, the humanities see a real need for understanding the importance of
the findings of the sciences, yet see no necessary connection between the
procedures which produced these findings and the findings themselves. This
is an attitude which the scientist is tempted to regard as cultivated ignorance.
As a result of this impasse in the face of need, some daring thinkers from
both sides periodically suggest a synthesis or integration among all the
disciplines, a proposal necessarily doomed to failure.
What I am suggesting is not a synthesis, nor any kind of common
marriage between the disciplinary branches. Rather than this, I am pro-
posing a non-disciplinary way to discuss the common concern by prescind-
ing from the admitted differences. The first such common concern is the
need for more creativity in all areas of inquiry. My proposal here is to
talk about the issue in aesthetic terms—the poetic drives and capabilities in
man. This naturally leads to a second dimension of the discussion—
a
normative one in the minimal sense of a way to evaluate the poetic effort,
a way to distinguish between the valuable and the useless, the good and the
bad, the socially important and the trivially true. This dimension of the
discussion could well be called the ascetic as opposed to the first which is
the aesthetic. The label is not as important as the fact, that because the
sciences and the humanities cannot meet on common disciplinary grounds,
they must meet on some trans-disciplinary conditions. The first of these
is the very making of discipline, which I have called the aesthetic trans-
formation of experience. The exploration of this area of common concern
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should lead to more explicitly normative concerns in which the common
human condition would be the base for judging the aesthetic enterprise
exfoliated in disciplinary development.
Catholic Scholarship and
Secular Learning
• Alden Fisher
CARICATURES of the Catholic intellectual and scholar consistently
portray him as waging a final and hopeless battle against the steadily
advancing forces of secular learning after a series of strategic re-
treats. The critic has only to point to such historic engagements as the
Church vs. Galileo, the Church vs. Darwin, and the Church vs. Freud to
establish presumably beyond question the truth of this interpretation of
the course of history. Nor can such a portrayal be brushed aside as the dis-
torted view of the militant secularist. Just as every caricature reveals an
aspect of truth, so this account of the relations between Catholic scholarship
and secular learning has just enough foundation in fact to convince many
sincere secular scholars and to disturb many of their Catholic counterparts.
Each major advance in science calls into question established views, not just
established scientific views, but cultural and religious values as well. Spec-
tacular scientific revolutions, first in the physical sciences, then in biology,
and now in psychology, have successively presented formidable challenges
to the man of faith. These challenges are almost invariably articulated in
terms of the possibility of reconciliation between the truths of faith and
the findings of secular disciplines.
What is the Catholic scholar—commited as he is to certain revealed
truths, to certain views about the nature of man, to certain moral values
—
to do in the face of this seemingly alarming situation? How can he retain
his scientific integrity and remain faithful to his personal religious com-
mitment? How can he remain true to his faith and pretend to the same
scientific and scholarly competence as his secular colleague? Can he be
both Christian and scientist and maintain his intellectual honesty? Must
he turn his back on either his faith or his science?
What contemporary Catholic scholars and critics alike tend to forget
is that conflicts between Athens and Rome, far from being a characteristic
phenomenon of modern times, are as old as Christianity itself. In his ad-
mirable little book. Faith and Reason in the Middle Ages, Etienne Gilson
traces the early history of this problem and describes the various positions
taken by Catholic thinkers. These descriptions have a completely modern
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ring. With us still are the Tertullians for whom the only truth is that of
divine revelation. With us still are the Averroists who manage to segregate
two distinct and apparently incompatible bodies of truth, that of science
(Aristotle's philosophy in the Middle Ages) and that of revelation.. It
is to the eternal credit of the Middle Ages that these positions (defended
then in terms of philosophy and theology) were not allowed to stand un-
challenged. Many men contributed to a definitive resolution of the question
;
it took a man of great learning, audacious intelligence, and deep and serene
faith to gather these elements together and mold them into a solution which
remains a monument of wisdom to this day. That man was Saint Thomas
Aquinas. The solution which Saint Thomas proposed was, fundamentally,
one of order. As Professor Gilson puts it, the difficulty lay in the fact that
some theologians wanted to theologize in philosophy, whereas some philoso-
phers wanted to philosophize in theology. Consequently, the only way to
bring that controversy to a close was for Saint Thomas to handle philosophi-
cal problems as a philosopher and theological problems as a theologian.
Three things were immediately apparent to St. Thomas. First, there can
be only one truth. Secondly, God could and did reveal certain truths to men
and these truths stand with the authority of God Himself. These truths are
intelligible and can be to some extent understood by man. They are mean-
ingful, not empty formulae. Finally, St. Thomas was thoroughly convinced
that the human mind is capable of attaining genuine truth about the way
things are under its own power. One has no more right to doubt a certain
insight gained by the mind independently of Revelation than one has to
doubt Revelation itself. If one falls, so does the other. .
Given these solid presuppositions, St. Thomas went on to establish
the relative autonomy of philosophy and theology on the basis of their dis-
tinct and proper starting points, methods, and ways of stating their con-
clusions. But these two disciplines, distinct as they are, do not thereby
arrive at two truths. St. Thomas demonstrated how they both contribute in
their own proper way, and necessarily so, to the whole truth which is one.
At the heart of the difficulty which St. Thomas faced was the pervasive
tendency of disciplines to become imperialistic, a recurrent tendency in the
history of human knowing. This is the attempt to reduce all valid knowledge
to one ideal type, in St. Thomas' day to philosophy or theology, in ours
perhaps to mathematics or empirical science. As long as this tendency
prevails there can be no satisfactory solution to the dilemma confronting the
Catholic scientist or scholar.
St. Thomas' solution is based on a careful examination of the intrinsic
character of the disciplines in question and then on a balanced ordering
of them with respect to each other. Given the development of fundamentally
new modes of knowing and the proliferation of disciplines since Aquinas,
the simple application of his solution provides only most abstract answers
to contemporary problems. A satisfactory response to the challenge of con-
temporary secular learning can be achieved only on the basis of a penetrat-
ing look at contemporary disciplines in their own terms. What follows is
an attempt to sketch in the broad lines of a contemporary solution to this
centuries-old problem. The general principles of the solution are taken
from Aquinas; their concrete and specific formulation is based upon the
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efforts of several vigorous contemporary thinkers.^
The first step in any viable solution to our problem involves under-
standing and acquiescing in the given rather than imposing predetermined
ideas. In the case in hand, this acquiescence in the given means coming to
accept the real plurality of knowledges and methods. In the order of positive
science, one finds the natural and physical sciences and other groups of
sciences: psychological, social, and historical sciences. In addition to
positive sciences,we find philosophical knowledge and theological knowledge.
To appreciate the degree of autonomy which each of these enjoys, it is
necessary to understand what constitutes them as separate ways of knowing
and something of their relation to each other. The first question is: do
these sciences possess an inner coherence which is proper to them; does
each constitute an autonomous mode of knowing? The term "autonomy"
can be understood in two different senses: in an extreme sense which would
be a total isolation, or the more narrow sense of self-consistency. Philosophy
and the various individual sciences cannot be totally divorced from one
another—first, because their results and methods are mutually enriching,
and, more importantly, because they study the reality. Furthermore, theology
itself is dependent on philosophy for its tools. Thus, to speak of autonomy
in the first sense would be contrary to the facts. Whatever autonomy exists
is in the second sense..
In the words of Ladriere, "each type of human experience is character-
ized by evidence which is proper to it. There is the evidence of sense per-
ception, the evidence of aesthetic perception, evidence of the emotions, and
so forth. This amounts to saying that the characteristic object of each of
these types of experience has its own proper way of offering itself to the
mind to which it is presented: We do not live a feeling of fear, for example,
in the same way as we live an aesthetic emotion incited in us by the sight
of a harmonious monument."^ Each one of these modes of evidence is
linked with a fundamental attitude or originating intention. The term "at-
titude" should obviously not be taken in the psychological sense. It is in
no way an observable reaction to a given situation, but rather a natural
or original modality of the intellect. By fundamental intention I am re-
ferring to something which is prior to visible behavior. It is prior with a
priority, not of time, but of foundation. A fundamental intention is a way
of turning toward reality, a way of approaching the world in which we
live. Thus, several different fundamental attitudes can be taken with respect
to the same reality. Each fundamental attitude engenders a mode of evidence
which is proper to it. Evidence does not exist in a pure state, by itself. It
can exist only in relation to a given attitude or intention. The scientific
attitude determines the system of evidence proper to it, and the philosophical
and theological attitudes determine their systems of evidence. In the
evolution of knowledge this system of evidence proper to each fundamental
' In particular, upon the work of Henle and Klubertanz; however, for the specific
formulation here I am especially indebted to Jean Ladriere whom I have followed rather closely
(cf. Ladriere, "La Liberie de la recherche dans les science de la nature," in Libertc ct I'erite,
Louvain, Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1954.)
= J. Ladriere, op. cit., pA72.
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intention is gradually developed as its field of extension is progressively ex-
plored. This exploration involves both the acquisition of results and the
perfecting of a method. The results are a function of the method. But the
method itself refers to the system of evidences and this latter refers to the
original attitude or intention.
It is beyond the limits of our space and our goal to describe in detail
each of these fundamental attitudes. Suffice it to say that wherever one
discovers such an originating intention, one finds the foundation for the
real autonomy or discipline. But at the same time one discovers the proper
limits to that autonomy. If each way of knowing can only be true to itself
4n the rigorous maintenance of its inner consistency and thus of its in-
dependence, then it ceases to conform to its proper essence and mission if
it goes beyond the limits of its own fundamental attitude or intention and
makes affirmations inconsistent with its methods and its evidences. For
the Catholic thinker, it should not be simply a question of drawing negative
lines. Our faith permits us to make an affirmation of the fundamental
coherence of reality. Since it is one and the same Creating Spirit which is
the principle of all reality, whether it be of the invisible reality of grace
or the visible reality discovered by human reason, there is necessarily a
(harmony in these orders of reality. There can be no genuine conflict.
Most important of all for the believers, philosophical endeavor and scientific
research can never be accepted merely in virtue of a principle of intellectual
tolerance. Philosophical truth, historical truth, and scientific truth are all
parts of the total truth, and it belongs to man to discover all that he can
of truth, using all the ways which God has placed at his disposal.
These brief considerations provide the outline of a modern Thomistic
solution to the problem posed for a Catholic scholar. This is all very well
in the abstract, but what does one do concretely when there seems to be
a conflict which all the good will in the world doesn't seem to resolve?
Having established the relative autonomy of the various sciences, philosophy,
and theology (as Saint Thomas did the relative autonomy of philosophy and
theology in his own time), the next step is to issue, in the spirit of St.
Thomas, a firm order to theology to cease pretending to be philosophy and
science, to science to cease attempting to erect itself into a philosophy and
a theology, to philosophy to stick to philosophizing. This does not mean
that the individual scientist cannot philosophize, and particularly about
the science he knows so well. But when he does so, he must realize that he
is taking a step back from his science, that he is no longer working within
the same fundamental intention. He is involved in a new way of approaching
reality, a way in which his constituted science itself becomes a given of
experience along with other equally important givens. Nor does this mean
that the philosopher cannot become a scientist. But in order to do so he
must place his philosophical approach in suspense and enter into the reality
of the science. He must make his own the originating attitude or intention
of the science. Failure to do this will only result in miserable science and
wretched philosophy. The same invitation and counsel holds for the theo-
logian.
Not only may a man become both a scientist and a philosopher, a
theologian and a man of science (or even all three), but it may even be
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imperative that some men do this. Saint Thomas himself, in order to elimi-
nate the confusion between philosophy and theology, was obliged to be
'both a philosopher and a theologian. It was only in being a very good
philosopher and a very good theologian that he was able to correct the
errors of both. It is clearly impossible for any one man to achieve for
modern learning what Saint Thomas did for mediaeval learning. The
age of the Summa is past and that of the Renaissance ideal, the universal
man, is gone forever. The contemporary situation demands a collective
effort and implies a collective responsibility. This means that we must
genuinely accept the sincerity and integrity of scholars everywhere, both
Catholic and non-Catholic. The Catholic must realize that men of science
are everywhere seeking the truth, usually with equal honesty. If some make
mistakes, they can be corrected only by a corresponding integrity on the
part of the Catholic savant.
All of this points to the absolute necessity of some Catholic thinkers
becoming thoroughly competent in all branches of knowledge. It is not
enough to learn skills, to become proficient in the application of discoveries
made by non-Catholic thinkers. If there is ever to be a reconstruction of
secular culture by Catholic scholarship, there must first be a reconstruction
of Catholic scholarship; Catholic scholarship must place itself at the very
frontiers of learning which is in itself neither Catholic nor secular—or
rather, all learning is catholic with a small "c". It is imperative that some
Catholic scholars think through the problems and work out the details of the
solution in each field. And this must be a continuing process, for in this
area of the wider implications of knowledge there are no definitive solutions.
Each new advance brings with it a spate of new questions to be answered.
Above all, it must be realized that there are no "Catholic positions" in
these matters—-except the one position of being open to the truth. One
must have the humility and the audacity to look at the evidence—and only
the evidence—but at all the evidence.
This illustrates the advantages and pitfalls facing a Catholic scholar
who attempts the reconstruction of secular culture, which can only mean
the uncompromising search for the whole truth. Because of his rich tradi-
tion and the heritage of centuries of wisdom, he is not as susceptible as
his religiously uncommitted colleague to certain errors or distortions. How
could he, for example, fall into the naive materialism of nineteenth century
scientism? How could he be tempted to think that Heisenberg's principle
of indeterminacy tells us anything about human freedom? His religious
background should also make him more sensitive to areas of evidence which
another might overlook. This does not mean the importation into the par-
ticular science of propositions from outside. A philosophical or theological
conclusion can best be only an extrinsic and negative guide. It means being
sure that no evidence pertinent to a particular discipline is neglected. Such
awareness can only make for better science. If the Catholic scholar fails
to do this, if in the name of Science he is really less objective than his non-
Christian colleague, he will one day find someone else pointing to the very
evidence which he himself should have long since brought to light. Ironical
as this situation may seem, it repeats itself every day—and it is only culpable
timidity on the part of the Catholic which permits it. Intellectual audacity
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and experimentation are at the very heart of progress in learning. But
such audacity is of its very nature a precarious, sometimes even dangerous
business. Should not the Catholic be the very one who can run these risks
with safety; who is better endowed in spiritual heritage for his intellectual
explorations?
On the other hand, the Catholic scholar faces certain pitfalls. Unfor-
tunately he may mistake certain traditional positions as necessarily true
simply because they are held by most Catholics. Such mistakes only em-
barrass the scholar and the Church when the position is proved wrong.
All of this means that the advantages of the Catholic scholar heighten his
responsibility to maintain the very highest standard of scientific integrity.
When conflicts arise between secular and Christian culture, it is not the
Catholic scholar's first task to thunder anathemas from his fortress of
truth. It is his peculiar task to bring calm, critical reflection to bear upon
the science, scholarship, and learning that comprise the foundation for
any culture. The cultural edifice can only be as strong as its foundation.
Therefore he must examine with utmost care the traditional philosophical and
theological positions as well as the findings of the particular sciences in
question. Because he knows that truth is one, he can be confident that the
conflict will be resolved. But such a serene attitude in the face of the pro-
digious complexity and the overwhelming advances of learning in our age
demands men of the strongest faith and total intellectual honesty. It is the
heavy responsibility of the Catholic institution of higher learning to provide
the atmosphere of freedom and security in which such rare virtues can
blossom and come to full bloom. And it is the responsibility of Catholic
educators at all levels to communicate some vision of this perspective to
students. If we fail in any of these matters, we are failing to live up to our
dual vocation, that of being scholars and Christians in the full sense of the
terms. As Christians we firmly believe that man is made to know the truth.
And whether it be the truth which is directly accessible to him, the truth
accessible to him through Revelation, or the truth which he can acquire with
the correct use of his reason in his philosophical or scientific endeavors,
what he discovers constitutes a part of the one and whole truth and this
cannot but be coherent with all the rest.
The Dialngue of Critics
• Brother Fidelian, F.S.C.
NO ONE DOUBTS that the dialectic between various discipHnes andareas of scholarship is a significant factor in the general progress of
learning. It is equally clear that what is more important in getting
us forward is the exchange which occurs within a discipline, the dialogue
between differing, and sometimes quite opposed, theories and points of
view about particular problems. One can hardly imagine a scholarly dis-
cipline without such a dialectic; its sharpness is often a good index to the
vitality of the field.
But, aside from eagerness and keenness, there are important differences
between the various intramural dialogues of modern learning. Between the
conversation in a "humanity" and in a science, especially, there are striking
contrasts. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that in a discipline like
literary criticism one rarely finds the radical and final displacement (or
should we say, "absorption"?) of one approach by another. However, this
phenomenon, or something very much like it, is fairly familiar in physics;
even more than spectacular success in technological application, it gives one
a sense that this discipline is progressing.
But with the critics, there seems to be only change, difference, variety.
Over the last three centuries, for instance, there has been change in the
critics' conclusions about the achievement of Milton. There is today dif-
ference of opinion among our Broadway critics over a middling play.
On the other hand, and more significantly, there is a puzzling variety of
ways by which the reviewers arrive at a consensus that something is ex-
cellent or is terrible.
The standard assumption made about this situation is that the sub-
jective element plays such a large part in the assessment of the human
values afforded by literature that no finality is possible to the conclusions
of criticism. No position could be more logical, of course, when it is held
by the relativist, for whom there is no disputing tastes—among contempo-
raries or the succeeding generations of critics. It is strange, however, to
ifind this same notion inhibiting in a thousand subtle but palpable ways
the dialogue of those who believe, nevertheless, that there is something ob-
jective in the literary work susceptible of judgement, that novels, plays, and
poems are good or bad, and that some are better than others.
There is the possibility, of course, that, if literary criticism has only
a tradition and a prospect of fluctuating interests and fashions, it can have no
essential progress. On the other hand, it may be—^to adapt a familiar ob-
servation—that its problems have been tried and found difficult; the poten-
tialities of the discipline itself are not really wanting. Despite its lamented
abundance, that is, it may be that the critical work has not yet been done
well or been done well very frequently.
The work of physics, it is clear, has been done well in the last hundred
years. The social process responsible for its advance is not radically dif-
ferent, however, for the process that gets one of the humanities any respect-
able distance: as C. I. Lewis has put it, "a group of men we rely on for
judgment because of their experience, their familarity with a tradition, and
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their greater powers of discernment have come up with certain truths."^
What then has limited the effectiveness of this process in the case of
criticism? Clearly, there are many factors. Perhaps the least important,
however, are those which, while not changing the intrinsic nature of the
process itself, have given it a direction quite different from the one it has
among the scientists. I am thinking particularly of the difference created
by having value as the object of concern. The point here, the primary
point at least, is not that the way is now open to be subjective rather than
"objective", or inaccurate rather than precise, or provisional rather than
definitive. The primary point is that men are now engaged in assessing, in
judging; they are not describing or measuring. The truth they "come up
with" is that something is a literary success, is beautiful as literature can
be beautiful. And it should be noted, they are not simply reporting that
they have enjoyed the work; they are making an assertion about the work
itself and about its potentiality to please others.
But if critical conclusions were simply this, they would not seem to
require that those we set apart to reach them should be anything more
than men with "greater powers of discernment." It is not clear, that is,
why they must also have experience and be familiar with a tradition. These
latter necessities arise from the reflex nature of criticism. As it has been
frequently observed, the critic does not simply judge, but he judges his
initial judgment of a work—a play, for instance—by all the relevant know-
ledge at his disposal: knowledge which he gets from his experience of other
plays, of the tradition of plays in general, and of this play in particular.
While his first and final work is to assess, therefore, the intermediate work
of the critic is to know, to describe, to measure. His function is, in a word,
not simple, but complex; his discipline itself is not autonomous in all its
operations, but dependent on other disciplines for revelant knowledge.
Thus, if literary criticism were simply a matter of value judgments, we
could hardly speak of progress in the discipline. Sensitive judgments, like
superb powers of creation, are not the exclusive privilege of later centuries.
However, a literary criticism is a judgment provided with a set of reasons.
In the provision of such reasons, there can, fortunately, be improvements.
We can have more knowledge and more accurate knowledge at our disposal,
and we can learn better ways of showing its relevance to our judgments.
In both these fashions, criticism can progress.
But we must return to the notion of intramural dialogue among critics.
It is clear that this activity has not kept pace with that in other areas of
literary study—central areas like literary history and preparatory fields
like textual criticism—and even less with related disciplines like linguistics.
We need hardly say that the critical dialogue will not be enlivened auto-
matically by the surge of the related dialogues. The scandalously apparent
fact is that the house of the critics is not in order. There is new knowledge,
but, among critics, no consensus about which particular kinds of knowledge
are required for the critical work; for, even more radically there is no
agreement about which value the critic is testing. Some agreement has
^ An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, (LaSalle, 111.; 1946), p. 460.
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emerged, though, about how knowledge should be focused in the act of
criticism. There has been, that is, the growing concentration during the
last fifty years on the Uterary object itself as opposed to extrinsic factors.
"In America, at least," as M. H. Abrams remarks, "some form of the ob-
jective point of view has already gone far to displace its rivals as the reign-
ing mode of literary criticism."^
We have found, however, that this is a very general mode and, if in-
deed it reigns, it is a ruling house divided against itself. For criticism is
still haunted by two very basic issues: what the precise object of its opera-
tion is, that is, what the nature of the literary value is, and, secondly, what
the most appropriate and efficient method of dealing with this object is.
These problems have kept the critics talking—with ever increasing volume
but, unfortunately, with a diversity that gives few signs of diminishing.
Not until something like a consensus is reached, however, at least about the
first of these problems, can there be any general progress.
There have been, it is true, important individual breakthroughs in these
matters by contemporary scholars. The generally poor condition of dialogue
among critics, however, has not permitted either the thorough testing of
these new concepts or even the recognition which they deserve. And there
are many dimensions to this failure. In recent issues of the journals, for
example, one can find surveys by leading American scholars of major
aspects of these problems, surveys which do not contain a single reference
to relevant European scholarship or even to the work of important Europeans
now working in this country. Reviews of new books are often superficial,
while systematic analysis of critical theories are labeled "criticism of criti-
cism" and go unanswered. Even at a meeting devoted to criticism, it is
possible to read a paper diametrically opposed to the doctrine of another
paper and to find that no discussion develops about this fact. It is pain-
fully clear, too, that the sections of the Modern Language Association de-
voted to criticism rarely program papers at the annual meeting in a way to
engage different points of view, make any sensible provision for discussion,
or provide any continuity from year to year. Even the group perhaps best
equipped to arrange confrontations of opposed theories and rational dis-
cussion of their differences—The English Institute—has frequently failed
to create this stimulation.
The dialogue of critics, and especially the academic critics, is thus
hampered in many ways. These limitations, though, are rather symptoms
than causes of the present malaise. More fundamentally responsible, I think,
are certain prejudices regarding the critic as a professional, prejudices
which in every instance limit the rigor of his dialogue and so the progress
of his discipline. And these are prejudices of the critic's public and of the
critic himself.
As far as the public is concerned, it is no exaggeration to say that,
except in the rare case of the Broadway critics who, as a group, wield real
economic power, there is a general reluctance to grant critics a function
as distinct and serious as that of other intellectual workers in our society.
2 The Mirror and the Lamp, (New York, 1953), p. 28.
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Our critics are far less distinct a class than, say, our physicists. One reason
for this, as C. I. Lewis has remarked rather nicely, is that "the subjective
conditions for apprehending the beautiful are somewhat more commonly
satisfied than are those for the appreciation of truth in quantum mechanics."
Thus, the man in the street, having few doubts about his ignorance of
mechanics, readily identifies the physicists as those who know these mys-
teries and who are pushing that scientific enterprise forward. But the same
man, convinced of what he likes in the way of a play or a novel and seeing
what appears to be only similar convictions in the critic, naturally takes
him to be simply another pedestrian in his own street.
In a certain measure the modern critic can blame himself for this
lack of clear status. While he has been almost too successful in selling his
product (capitalizing on the generally unsettled condition and the wide-
spread questioning of values in our age), he has ironically enough, been
much less successful in clarifying to the public his function and its essential
difference from their own dealings wdth literature. He has, in fact been
much more anxious to emphasize the continuity of his work with the broad,
general, and unreflective interests of the public at large. He seeks, in a
word, to escape the odium of specialization. He is trying to play down the
obvious fact that he is performing, or attempting to perform, specialized
operations on literature for which the layman has usually neither capability,
interest, nor time—though he needs and demands the conclusions of such
work. If the critic owns up to any special role, it is to the modest one of
helping the layman understand what the waiter has tried to say, apparently
not too successfully.
The critic's punishment, fittingly enough, has been to realize finally
that he is burdened with a public image that has indeed very little of the
specialist about it. Perhaps, we should say he is only beginning to realize
his situation, for his mood is still quite egalitarian. So he continues, in
the name of more fruitful dialogue among all the members of his house-
hold, to raise his voice against class distinctions. In the Sunday supplement,
he takes the quarterlies to task for their jargon and their restricted interests;
in the quarterlies, he objects that the academic critics and the professors
are talking only to one another and not to the readers of quarterlies and
Sunday supplements. The second protest is strange indeed. As one recent
observer of the scene has suggested: "what prompts the objection is the fact
that academic criticism is often 'technical'—in short, that it is sometimes
academic. But if academic critics are to do the work proper to academic
criticism, I should think this must necessarily be so."
And again,
We do not complain because physicists address their techni-
cal discoveries and proposals to other physicists in terms
that for a layman amount to a code, and leave to others the
job of preparing pamphlets instructing layman in the use of
such applications of their science as may be made, also
usually by others. The layman himself demands some tech-
nical competence in those with whom he discusses the nice-
ties of his favorite sport or hobby, and certainly his busi-
ness. I do not see why, if we take matters of value seriously.
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we should require those who are most advanced in pursuit
of knowledge concerning them to behave differently . . r
But they do, unfortunately, behave differently nowadays, for the egali-
tarian spirit has invaded the highest towers of academe. Within the last few
years, for example, one could read in a philosophical journal an important
scholar rejecting one of the modern theories of poetry on the plea that
students would think it rather "cold." But when the work of a fellow scholar
purports to show what poetry is, it would seem much more important to
weigh the report against reality as we know it rather than against its effect
on learners.
This premature concern with rhetoric and pedagogy has led to a notable
slackening in the quality of scholarly discourse among critics themselves,
as that is represented, for example, by the New Criticism in its university
setting. There, as elsewhere, the dialogue among colleagues degenerates to
the imprecision of the dialogue one has developed in classroom and seminar.
The end result is a new Acedia. The pretense of this spirit is that the human
values afforded by literature will somehow be better protected (presumably
from the spirit of science and technology), if not better understood, when we
take a more relaxed approach to them. But this slackening has its dangers;
it can, in fact, lead to what Robert Oppenheimer, in a recent lecture, called
"philistinism" and described as the belief "that only those things which it
requires no trouble to understand are important." At a time when it is
so difficult to encompass even the smallest area of human learning, it is
very tempting, he continues, "to find reasons for closing our eyes and ears
to things and saying, 'No, no, this cannot be the reality; the reality must
be easier.' "^ But nothing, Valery answers, "is more complex or more dif-
ficult to disentangle than the strange combination of qualities found in
language," language which is given an even more complex and subtle order
by the poet.^
In the measure that we have been unsuccessful in coping with this
difficult art of the poet and in defending our judgments about it, we should,
one would think, logically direct ourselves to greater rigor in our study.
At the level of scholarship as such this would mean, negatively, less of the
distraction created by attempts at popularization. Positively, it would cer-
tainly require, among other things, the development of a more intense
dialogue. Needed for this progress, of course, are the qualities of all good
dialectic—openness, a deeper understanding of other positions, a common
desire for knowledge that can support diversity at length and that will not
look for half-truths to create abortive compromise and artificial unity. Im-
portant, too, is the need to carry on the dialogue about the fundamental
problems in a more clearly distinguished discipline of literary theory as
such. Not least important, will be the prudent choice of issues for the dia-
logue. They will have to be problems that demand the utter involvement of
both parties and yet leave room for what Emerson suggested is the third
member of any real dialogue, the truth.
3 James Craig La Driere, Directions in Contemporary Criticism and Literary
Scholarship (Milwaukee, 195S), pp. 53-54.
< "Tradition and Discovery," ACLS Newsletter, X (October, 1959), 19.
> Paul Valery, Tlie Art of Poetry, tr. Denise Folliot (New York, 195S), p. 191.
Doshie
• Lee Brian
FOR A TIME during my boy-Kood it was an unwritten law
in our houseKoId tKat my father's
judgment in all things was infallible
and, consequently, kis every w^nim
Kad to be gratified.
We had moved from the large
comfortable bouse on Forest Ave-
nue into a six room cottage on a
side street, and though our financial
plight was chiefly the result of his
lack of business acumen, no one in
our family, least of all my mother,
ever reminded him of that fact. In
the small cottage, where we always
seemed to be in one another's way,
we learned to make adjustments,
but not my father. Six of us, in-
cluding the maid, shared one small
bathroom, but he alone use the
private bath which adjoined his
bedroom; and in contrast to outs,
which generally was cluttered with
wet towels, soggy newspapers, and
slippery bars of soap, his was tidi-
ness itself, with two heavy towels
freshly laundered on the racks and
a fresh scent of eau de cologne
filling the air.
He was the soul of order. He had
a fetish for carrying only new cur-
rency in his wallet; the old bills he
gave to my mother for household
expenses, and humorously he liked
to chide her on the way the bills
slipped through her fingers. His
shirts had to be ironed with special
care, and God help the maid who
used starch in them.
For breakfast we ate, crowded
into the small breakfast room, eating
on the wooden table without cloth
and in full gaze of the garbage pail
in the kitchen. But under no cir-
cumstances would he come into the
breakfast room, and for good reason.
He hated anything cramped or
crowded. When he sat down to
meals, it was in the dining room at
a beautifully set table, replete with
silverware that had come from the
large house on Forest Avenue. On
Sunday mornings, when he per-
mitted the family to eat with him.
we were on good behavior and
sensible of the occasion. During
the early part of the meal he cor-
rected our grammar, my brother's
and mine, and reminded us fre-
quently how to use a fork with our
eggs; repeatedly he cautioned us
against reading the funnies and not
enough of Walter Scott. W^e knew
we could never please him, and as
children we aimed merely to win
from him a grudging approval.
Praise w^ith him w^as as rare as
May snow.
With his second cup of coffee on
Sunday morning, conversation came
to an end, for he was ready to listen
to music. He had a large collection
of albums, but on Sundays he pre-
ferred Schubert or Brahms. He
would send me to put on something
that he had previously selected. The
machine was an old-fashioned pale
walnut Edison gramophone, enor-
mous in size, and my mother used
to complain mildly how^ heavy it
was to move when she or the maid
had to dust.
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While my father hstened to the
music in the dining room, we would
sit in silence. Even normal room
sounds annoyed him while the record
played. My mother and the maid
had to walk on tiptoe while they
removed the silver and dishes from
the table. After breakfast, if the
weather was nice, we sat on the side
porch with him, the gramophone
going full blast the whole time, and
no one dared to lower the volume.
Despite my father's rather arbi-
trary ways, and thanks to my
mother's benign disposition, April
reigned throughout the year in our
household; the order which my
father worshipped and demanded of
us, she never seemed to produce in
the house; and it was something
he never allowed her to forget.
Chiefly, it seemed to us children,
this deficiency had to do with the
problem of keeping an all purpose
maid. My father, accustomed to
servants and to instant attention in
the old house, could not understand
why my mother was unable to deal
with the maid and why each in turn
left us almost as soon as she had
started. He put it down to a lack
of firmness and decision on my
mother's part. We shared his opin-
ion, though we were less verbal
about expressing it. We all de-
plored mother's weakness and hoped
that in time my father would help
her overcome it.
One blustery March morning
when we were late for school and
the baby was crying and our lunches
weren't ready and my father was
cross, Doshie came to work for us;
and she set upon her tasks with such
zest and energy that we knew at
once she was a godsend. With her
arrival, at least one problem in our
household seemed solved. She was
a born servant, \vith her strong
capable hands and big bones, and
though she couldn't have been long
out of her teens, she looked much
older, and we thought of her as
being my mother's age. Actually we
were surprised one day to find that
she was only twenty-one.
My father determined at the be-
ginning not to let Doshie rule the
household, for he felt that my
mother s sad experience with maids
in the past had been due to her
natural tendency to be imposed
upon. He therefore was unusually
vigilant for any sign of independ-
ence or rebellion on Doshie's part.
The first Sunday after her arrival,
while we were listening to Brahms
in the living, he heard her making
an unnecessary amount of noise as
she replaced the silver in the drawer,
and he called out, "Doshie, can't
you beless noisy T"
"Beg pardon, " she said, coming to
the doorway.
"Less noise, less noise, ' he called
in that imperious voice he sometimes
reserved for servants and children.
"You are interrupting some of the
most sublime music ever written.
'
And then seeing that she stared at
him without being able to make a
suitable reply, he dropped his tone
of belligerency and invited her to
come in to listen. Embarrassed, she
mumbled something and fled into
the kitchen. My mother hurried in.
"Be careful," she whispered to my
father; "we don't want to lose her."
My father, who had been warned
before, snorted at the prospect of
having to be careful with a servant.
"I'd rather do without help than be
subjected to this kind of t^Tanny,"
he said.
"She's the most obliging and
helpful girl I've had. " said my
mother, "and I don't want to
offend her."
38 Four Quarters
"It's absurd," said my father, "in
your own house not to be mistress
— to let an ignorant peasant girl, in
her own docile way, to be sure,
dictate to you.
"
"Oh, don't make an issue over
that again, Eric,' my mother said.
"You're the one making the issue,
"
he said. "All I did was to invite her
in to hsten. but you're unwilhng to
give her the chance to appreciate
good music." And though my
mother protested, he would not
rehnquish the notion and went for
Doshie.
"Eric, " exclaimed my mother
\vhen she saw Doshie follow him
back into the room, "she hasn t time
to hsten. We've got dishes to do
and the baby to bathe and ^ "
But for answer he merely put his
finger to his hps. I can see them
now: Doshie in her apron, her
cheeks still red from the country air,
her big clumsy hands in her maternal
lap, staring at the gramophone,
frightened and awed; and my
mother in her own gingham house-
coat, spotted with egg, as usual,
smiling at Doshie, as if to reassure
her that she needn't take either
my father's antics or the music
seriously.
"Isn't it magnificent? " said my
father. 'There's the major theme
again. Now the oboes have it. Lis-
ten to the oboes." And now his
grave courteous manner caused
Doshie additional embarrassment,
and she moved her head appeal-
ingly in the direction of my mother,
who finally took her away.
The following Sunday, vs^hile we
were listening to Schubert, my
mother sent Doshie in to low^er the
machine, for the loud volume was
making the baby restive. "It's time
the baby learned to sleep to Schu-
bert, " my father said. My mother
came in to remonstrate with him, but
he wouldn't let her get near the
machine. "A child of mine has to
appreciate Schubert," he said, and
my mother, defeated as usual, had
to retreat.
"We can put the baby on the
porch, ' said Doshie to my mother.
She won't hear the music there."
Doshie soon learned from my
mother not to cross my father, and in
time, she lost most of her fear of him.
She even grew bold enough to refuse
the Sunday morning invitation.
Out of the five dollars a week that
Doshie received, she kept out only
twenty-five cents, the remaining be-
ing left with my mother, \vho de-
posited it for her in a large Louis
Sherry candy box kept in the bottom
drawer of my mother's dresser.
Doshie's expenses were small.
Once a month she went home to
Caddo Mills, and then she would
draw out three dollars; eighty cents
went for her bus ticket, and the
balance was used for gifts for her
family: a box of chocolate-covered
cherries and a pair of stockings for
her mother, smoking tobacco for her
father. She returned to us on Sun-
day night laden with presents:
churned butter, a sack of country
fresh eggs, sausage and preserves,
home-made popcorn.
W^e used to tease Doshie about
her savings, and my brother told her
once that she had close to a thou-
sand dollars, but she wouldn't be-
lieve him, whereupon he tried to
work it out mathematically, but, be-
coming involved in difficulty, pre-
sented the problem to my father, and
he figured out to the penny that
Doshie should have one hundred
and sixty-three dollars, an amount
which was verified w^hen Doshie
opened the Louis Sherry box and
counted her bills.
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My father suggested that she open
an account at the bank, but she was
afraid of banks, and no doubt she
was right. I was just after the
time w^hen the banks were closing
throughout the country, and my
father himself had lost heavily in
two banks. Seeing now^ that Doshie
would have nothing to do with
banks, he advised her to convert the
money into large denomination bills
and these could be locked away in
a drawer. "They'll make you a suit-
able dowry, " he said. My mother
explained to Doshie what a dowry
was, and she blushed and giggled.
The idea of Doshie's getting married
amused us all.
A few nights later, just as we
were finishing supper, the phone
rang. I answered it. A man with
a blurred voice asked for Doshie.
It took me a few minutes to realize
who he was calhng for. She had
never received a telephone call be-
fore, and conversation at the table
stopped until she returned. "Is a
relative of yours in town? " asked
my mother.
"No'm, " said Doshie. She was
removing the dessert dishes. "Just
an old friend from Caddo Mills.
"
"If he's in town long, you might
ask him out.
"
"Yes'm, " said Doshie in her
usually laconic way.
"I bet he's your boy friend, " said
my brother.
Doshie giggled and her checks
flushed.
"Any night you w^ant to entertain
him, " said my mother, "you are wel-
come to use the parlor.
"
"Thank you, ma'am, " said Doshie.
We hardly expected her to take
advantage of the offer, but sure
enough a few nights later, my
mother cautioned us to stay out of
the room that night because Doshie
had requested permission to receive
her gentleman friend. As might be
expected, my father reacted most
unfavorably to the prospect of being
denied the use of his own living
room.
"Maybe he's interested in good
music, " my mother said brightly.
My father merely frowned, but,
perhaps recognizing for once the
necessity of complying with my
mother's request, he presented no
other obstacle to the plan. We were
dying to see what the young man
looked like and ran to the door when
the bell rang. Our surprise couldn't
have been greater if the Man in
the Iron Mask had stood there.
He was surely as old as my father
but much heavier, and he wore an
odd coat which did not match his
baggy trousers; there was a general
air of disrepute about him that
chilled us. He also smelled of what
we took to be a too generous use of
bay rum or rubbing alcohol.
We came to report our disap-
pointment. "Now, now. " said my
mother, "you boys have no business
spying. Stay in the breakfast room.
We did, doing our lessons, my
father reading. Occasionally from
habit he would grumble as he
looked through the doorway when
the swinging door opened: the idea
of being denied the use of his own
living room! And each time my
mother would reprove him. I was
having trouble with fractions and
he helped me, working two ver\' dif-
ficult problems which had stumped
Miss Evans, and when I told him
this, he was so pleased that he
stayed in a good humor for an hour
and even forgot Doshie and her
friend. Earlier, my mother had taken
a pitcher of lemonade and a plate
of cookies into the living room. She
returned to us almost as shocked as
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we had been. "Why, He's an old
man." she said, "an old man."
"I just wonder how long they re
going to stay," said my father.
"They're going for a walk, " said
my mother. "So you're free to go
back in."
We could see the man as he
walked out on the porch holding
Doshie's arm. He had a fat red
neck, pudgy in back, and the skin
was grizzled hke a turkey's. The
whole house reeked of what my
father informed us with disgust w^as
cheap whiskey.
"Some suitor. " said my father,
"some suitor." He opened the front
door to freshen the room. Then he
put on the Trout. He made it as
loud as he could because he didn't
want to hear any talk. He wanted
us to be quiet. My brother and I
read the funnies. Presently above
the music we heard whispers from
the frontporch, and then the blurred
voice of Doshie's friend was raised
and once we heard Doshie say, "All
right, " and they both came inside.
"W^here's your mother?" Doshie
asked me.
"She's in the kitchen, " I said.
"I'll be back in a minute," Doshie
said to Isom ^- we had learned his
name. He stayed by the door while
she went in to see my mother. He
tried to focus on the music, but it
was beyond him. My father, to
whom he had been introduced by
Doshie, took no notice of him, but
almost instinctively raised the knob
of the machine. I felt relieved by
the gesture, because I knew that my
father, once he did notice Isom,
would be frightfully cutting, and I
didn't know how Isom, whose con-
dition frightened me, would react.
The volume came up even louder
than before, but after a minute I
was surprised to hear Isom talking
to my father. "I beg your pardon,
"
he said, "Doshie's just gone to tell
the missus that her and me are
aiming to get married.
"
My father looked at Isom. He was
surprised but concealed his feelings
by merely nodding.
"I helped raise that girl, " ex-
plained Isom. "She and me been
keeping company for some time."
"That's interesting," said my
father.
"Now wed just like to trouble
you for that little bit of money you're
keeping for her. " Oh, I thought,
now my father's going to laugh
right in Isom's face, but at that
moment before my father could
laugh, my mother and Doshie came
in. My mother went directly to
Isom. "This is so sudden," she said.
"I'm sorry ^ Mister — I didn't get
your name.
"Isom, " said my father, who was
exceptionally good at remembering
names.
"Yes, Mr. Isom, this is most sud-
den — your plan to marry Doshie.
And isn't it rather late for the cere-
mony tonight?
"
Doshie was rubbing her big red
hands together and standing pigeon-
toed behind my father's soft chair.
My mother was standing close to
her. "Can't you wait till tomorrow,
Doshie? You must give your folks
the opportunity to come to town.
"
Doshie stopped rubbing her hands
together and turned to Isom, as if
the proposition was for him to con-
sider. My mother was still talking.
"I'll bake a cake tomorrow. I've just
read a new recipe in tonight s paper.
W^ith pineapple filling."
"Yes'm," said Doshie to whom
the idea appealed.
"W^e aim to marry tonight," said
Isom. "She wants her money to-
night."
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For some reason fie was speaking
to my father, and he mumbled his
words out of the side of his mouth
in a way that continued to fill me
wilh fear. It occurred to me that
my father did not sufficiently gauge
the menace presented by Isom's ugly
manner, or else he would pay him
more attention.
"Doshie," said my mother, still
trying to reach her, "do you really
want to marry tonight?"
"Yes'm," said Doshie, but with-
out any force in her voice.
"She'd better get her money,"
said Isom again to my father, but
my father now commenced what
seemed for all the world like a game,
a casual and unpremeditated game,
in the course of which he changed
the record, replaced it with Brahms'
First, turned the volume up, and
looked, even though Isom was star-
ing sullenly at him, as if he were
deep in thought on some problem
connected with fractions.
You tell you wife to give Doshie
her money, " insisted Isom, and at
this moment my father, seeing per-
haps that he could not delay except
at his own peril, taking some action,
looked at my mother. "Marcia," he
said tentatively, "Marcia '—-
"
My mother shook her head.
Isom s lips moved, and he showed
his yellow teeth. "You let Doshie
have her money," he said in a cold
voice that made my blood freeze.
"Marcia, " continued my father in
his clear imperious voice, the voice
which he used when he called for
silence at the table, "Marcia, you
have no right to keep the girl's
money.
"
"Tomorrow," said my mother. 1
couldn t believe my ears and dared
not look at my father. "Tomorrow
will be time enough, and I'm sure
Doshie agrees. She doesn't want to
get married without a veil. Now do
you, Doshie." I couldn't tell whether
Doshie agreed or not. "Tomorrow,"
continued my mother, "we 11 get up
to the attic and look through those
old trunks. I'm sure I can find a
veil. You'll love it, Doshie.
"
"Yes'm," said Doshie. But I
hardly heard her reply. I was watch-
ing Isom again. His face had
hardened and his fist was taking
shape. I don't know if my mother
saw the fist or not, or if she heard
his heavy breathing. She walked
past him and held the screen door
open. "Good night, Mr. Isom, " she
said. It was that simple. I guess he
was too surprised to do anything
except stumble out; and even then,
my mother, quick as usual, stood
between him and Doshie, who still
kept her pigeon-toed stance by the
soft chair. After Isom had gone, my
mother went up to Doshie and put
her hand on the girl's shoulder.
"You really didn't want to go with
him, did you, Doshie?"
"No'm, " said Doshie.
After a minute she started to col-
lect the glasses and cake plates.
Only then did I hear the Brahms.
The record was still on, the second
movement, I noted. I remembered it
had been going full blast earlier,
but no^v the music ^vas hardly audi-
ble. Surely Doshie hadn't touched
the machine, for, as she gathered the
dishes and picked up the crumbs
from the carpet, she seemed totally
unaware that it was playing. She
started to leave the room, and my
mother said, "Tomorrow, Doshie,
we must dust in here. How fast the
dust settles on everything! Just look
at it!"
^
"Yes'm, ' said Doshie.
"And we must take the curtains
down, too, " said my mother. 'And
we might as well wash the win-
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dows." bent over it, straining to hear the
I glanced at my father, wonder- familiar notes above their conversa-
ing why he didn't object to the tion. He might have been in another
conversation, why, too, he hadn't world, or else —
demanded to know who had dared That night I went to bed in a
lower the volume, but he stood close funny frame of mind,
by the gramophone, with his head
Five Haiku
I James Kritzeck
Thunder;
rain's crescendo:
Jun-Ico plucks a string
and its sound fades slowly.
Summer clowns;
necessary smiles:
would laughs erase
Jun-ko's winter love?
Red berries on far banks;
autumn
:
how will Jun-ko change
while I am gone?
Cold-night fires;
a cloud moves toward a star:
I am learning
Jun-ko's language.
Tarnished moons; withered
blossoms; spoilt spring:
our last season,
Jun-ko, apart.
FRANK ELISCU is working on a statue of the Blessed Virgin for the church
of the Father Judge Mission Seminary at Lynchburg. He has just completed
the collaborative Medal of Honor for the Architectural League of New York.
As he says, "My work will continue to show the Humanism of Man and Art."
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Hope
• Sister Mary Honora, O.S.F.
Windfall of impedient whiteness — snow ^
does not un-Damon PytKias. It chalks
the minutes on the ground, and rather lessens
the peril routed in the albino air
hoarfrosting a sequel predestinate.
Damon in his cell leans out toward cotton
blobs that run silver down his cheek until
he sees the plane of Pythias a crystal ship
at port.
Old Dionysius notes the ground is
greening where warm boot and sandal blunder.
Psalm to Mary
• Dolores Kendrick
When God plucks my red soul
Into the sour wind
Cover me with your doved Amen
And fly through the white sky
W^ith me (moon-driven,
Blessed and un-boned) to the
Sun-century;
Then press my naked tongue
To the ash of sea and star
And let me go.
JOOST MARECHAL, painter and ceramist, is Professor of Art at The In-
stitut Superior, Saint Lucas, Ghent, Belgium.
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Exile
# Margaret Reardon
I have slept this night witK sorrow and its dark tyranny.
Now God give me your Omnipotent hand
For strength to hear the coming day.
The day when we must go forth
In the blindness of fear and desolation
From this place that saw our birth and growth.
And now our bitter age.
Our roots have been torn from the reluctant soil.
Leaving a gaping wound in the earth,
And a dark mound of sorrow.
Sister, awake, the hour draws near
NVhen the sad convoy approaches
That leads us down to the desolation of the exihng sea.
It is almost day. The dawn is creeping over Knoch-na-Brun
Quenching with its misty fingers the small stars.
It creeps over the white bloom of the May tree
That stands unchanged since childhood.
Only ourselves are changed,
And we behold its beauty through the orbs of death.
Through the window I see the fields
Where our father plowed.
There is the lane through vs^hich our people passed
To their lone sleep in the holy meadow beyond the glen.
Give me our last poor treasures for the trunk.
And the bit of candle that shone light to our mother
On her last journey long ago.
Now covering them all like a shroud
I'll put my mother's shawl
And quickly, girl, before I remember
Its folds across her warm breast
And break my heart with sorrow.
The time is at hand, there's knocking at the door.
Quench the candle, sister,
Better the darkness as we leave this familiar room.
Then shall we last behold it
With the happy eyes of childhood.
Rather than through the scalding, bitter tears of age.
46
SomG Friend's Soul
• Daniel J. Rogers
Some friend's soul is borne to me, upon
occasion, a tear full at a time ^
nearnesses brimming to garble my
old knowledge. Sympathy lies useless,
new scotch loses strength in the pouring.
Across from me he settles down, half-
shamed at being ashamed of a tear;
I sit and wait and need to feel I
also serve, denied, meanwhile, under-
ground meanderings of his man soul.
Books? And hearth? Or loves and the children
laughter-light? They hardly fill, themselves,
a need as this. Nor do I, on edge
of hushed, nicely smogged-up chasm, thirsting
half brewed knowings of heaven-soaked nows.
finnwn at Brand Canyon
• Rita M. Schaeffer
An almost raw, a new. a naked pink.
One second's cicatrice upon the place;
Perhaps a grace note counterpointing space,
A baby lizard quivers at the brink.
Such blistering of being will be found.
Be toed by tourists sentimentally.
But one mercuric shiver sets him free,
A fluid even to the feel of ground.
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Sbg Hdw All My Craft
# Suzanne Gross
See how all my craft, falcon-keen, diving
at my heart become his heart, taloned words
shot out to pierce it, stay it in its high riding
sure and alone the rhythms of inviolable hght, suddenly
veers, sheers off, shps on a trivial current,
or leaps, silent, up the sky.
Speech was never found edged to this end.
Music perhaps, perhaps dancing: the soaring and wing-risen
yearning of the heart past poetry as my mind becomes
the hushed and holy stage on where he comes and goes,
masked in his simple and outward earth, or a king's gold,
or the color of his griefs that only my grieving knows,
all beyond my tears.
The bravest bull never paws the ground importantly,
never bellows for his bravery or pain. Will-wedded
to his one want, he charges, follows, finds and gores,
awaits death, dies, all soon and soundlesssly,
but for the brief profound vibration his need's rush makes
through the mortal sand.
As he would surely be, so I must be ashamed
to raise banners of words for my love's cause. Let others,
seeing me wear this penitent's gown, suffering
for joy, or this better than a god's enchanted armor, exulting
in my sorrows, say for me: she kneels and bleeds on holy stones,
she arms for her shining death.
No longer is it loss not to word him to the world.
Only my heart and the heart of Christ at last
know or care that he shines so, moving solitary and beautiful,
under and through the weight of his seaward darkening days;
or that I sit patient and still, one-willed
on the shelving bank of time.
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